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Executive Summary
The purpose of this study is to develop an empirically based model to serve as a starting point for 
designing development strategies for Pakistan and similar countries, where aid has produced few 
tangible gains and the economy has not been able to generate sustained periods of growth. Within this 
framework, the model seeks to integrate into the entrepreneurship-led growth strategy of Expeditionary 
Economics several related but diverse strands of research: the literature on governance and economic 
growth, factors underpinning entrepreneurship, and the diverse forces contributing to instability. The 
hope is that ultimately the analysis will yield a plan of action and a way of identifying the sequencing of 
reforms that can be applied to a wide variety of conflict/post-conflict settings in the developing world. 
The study found that:
 1.  It is unlikely in Pakistan’s current institutional/political setting that traditional aid programs, even 
with greatly expanded funding, could initiate a process of institutional development and reform 
sufficient to offset Pakistan’s current slow growth and cycle of violence (see Fig. ES-1).
 2.  However, an extensive quantitative assessment of successful country growth patterns found that 
entrepreneurial activity is a key element in driving the growth process through progressive stages 
of economic development.
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 3.  Successful countries whose development relies on increased entrepreneurial activity appear 
to sustain growth through a series of ongoing reforms initiated by this growing stakeholder 
group. As a result, they are able to establish virtuous circles of increased economic liberalization, 
extended entrepreneurship, expanded growth, and improved governance, which lead in turn to 
further growth and development.
 4.  Increased trade liberalization and improvements in the business climate are the most  
important factors for stimulating entrepreneurial expansion for countries at Pakistan’s stage  
of development. 
 5.  Consequently, entrepreneurial efforts could be expanded in the short term without major 
improvements in governance. 
 6.  Entrepreneurship-led development could potentially create a virtuous circle of growth and 
reform in Pakistan capable of overcoming the constraints of violence, bureaucratic inertia,  
and the country’s many vested interests.
 7.  In principle, Pakistan’s New Growth Framework incorporates all of the elements noted above.
 8.  Drawing on these findings, the principles of Expeditionary Economics should facilitate a policy 
shift toward the New Growth Framework, especially in areas where the central government has 
thus far been unable to be an effective agent for economic betterment.
 9.  There are numerous opportunities for the United States and European Union to contribute to 
Pakistan’s economic revival and sustained growth.
  A trend setter in Asia up to the sixties, economic management in Pakistan has steadily deteriorated 
to the point where the economy has, for the past few decades, lurched from one financial crisis  
to the next. At the heart of the problem has been the poor management of public finances and  
deep-seated unresolved structural issues in the economy that bad management and poor 
governance has exacerbated. The consequences of this secular decline in economic governance  
are plain to see: macroeconomic instability, high inflation, poor public services, criminal neglect 
of the social sectors, widespread corruption, crippling power outages, growing unemployment, 
deepening poverty and a deteriorating debt profile.1
1. Meekal Ahmed, “An Economic Crisis State?” in Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State, ed. Maleeha Lodhi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 
169.
E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p  a n d  t h e  P r o c e s s  o f  D e v e l o p m e n t : 
A  F r a m e w o r k  f o r  A p p l i e d  E x p e d i t i o n a r y  E c o n o m i c s  i n  P a k i s t a n
T a b l e  o f  C o n t e n t s
Table of Contents
Introduction ...................................................... 2
Potential Constraints on Pakistan’s  
Economic Advancement and  
Entrepreneurial Activity ................................... 5
 Potential Competitiveness Constraints ............ 5
  Limited Institutional  
Development: Governance ............................. 8
    Voice and Accountability ........................... 10
    Political Stability/Absence of Violence ........ 10
    Government Effectiveness ......................... 11
    Regulatory Quality .................................... 12
    Rule of Law ............................................... 13
    Control of Corruption ............................... 13
 Potential Economic Reform Constraints ........ 14
 Limited Progress in Economic Freedom ......... 15
 Deficiencies in  
 Entrepreneurial Access to Capital ................. 16
Constraints on Pakistan’s Growth  
Potential and Entrepreneurship .................... 19
  Key Dimensions of Growth  
Potential and Entrepreneurship ..................... 21
 Discriminant Analysis — 
 Key Constraints on Group Advancement ...... 28
 Regression Analysis — 
 Key Linkages Surrounding  
 Entrepreneurship .......................................... 30
     Factors Contributing to  
Increased Entrepreneurship ....................... 31
    Entrepreneurship and Governance............. 32
     Entrepreneurship, Governance, and  
the Shadow Economy ............................... 38
  
Implications of the Model for  
Pakistan’s New Growth Framework  
and Expeditionary Economics ....................... 41
 The Failure of Foreign Aid ............................ 42
  Entrepreneurial Development and  
the New Growth Framework ........................ 43
  The Application of Expeditionary  
Economics to Pakistan .................................. 46
Policy Implications ..........................................48
 Trade Policy .................................................. 48
 Infrastructure Policy ..................................... 50
  Business Freedom/Removing  
Constraints on Entrepreneurship .................. 51
 Assessment — Mancur Olson’s Coalitions ..... 52
Conclusion  ......................................................54
1
2I n t r o d u c t i o n
Introduction
As one of the central countries in the United 
States’ “War on Terror,” Pakistan’s stability has 
global import. Unfortunately, this stability is 
increasingly threatened by the restlessness of tribal 
groups in areas bordering Afghanistan, the 
continued dispute with India over Kashmir, and 
internal discontent among various factions within 
the government and population. Without sustained 
economic growth and major improvements to its 
security and institutions, Pakistan’s situation will 
likely continue to deteriorate, impairing efforts to 
bring stability to Afghanistan and to South Asia as 
a whole.2
Most observers are pessimistic about Pakistan’s 
near-term future. A leading expert, Stephen 
Cohen, suggests that: “Over the next five years, 
Pakistan’s success as a stable state, measured 
along any dimension, is far from guaranteed, and 
in fact, the ‘normalization’ of Pakistan remains 
doubtful.”3 Cohen concludes that, under the most 
probable scenario, Pakistan will continue to 
struggle with a chronically deteriorating economy 
and ever-pressing political and regional security 
challenges. 
A recent Rand report echoes Cohen’s 
assessment, concluding that the near-term future 
will see a “Pakistan that ‘muddles’ along, neither 
failing outright nor managing to right its course.”4 
According to the report, future scenarios range 
from the emergence of an increasingly technocratic 
state, to an Islamist state, to the breakup of the 
state along regional and factional lines—any of 
which would exacerbate regional instability. In the 
most likely scenario, Pakistan will evolve into an 
“authoritarian state tightly under the control of the 
military and intelligence agencies.”5
Shahid Javed Burki sees direct links between  
the recent rise of extremism in Pakistan and  
rapid increases in population, coupled with 
economic mismanagement. He suggests that the 
government’s focus should have been “not only on 
getting the economy to grow rapidly—which it did 
on occasions and during the periods when the 
military was in charge—but also on ensuring that 
the rewards of rapid growth were widely 
distributed.”6 The failure to do so has spawned 
“millions of alienated youth with little faith in their 
future. They have been successfully recruited to 
jihadist causes. The latest of these is the 
destruction of the Pakistani state.”7 
Failure to prudently distribute the rewards of 
growth has been only one of many weaknesses in 
Pakistan’s development policies. Pakistan is 
plagued by a long-term pattern of economic stops 
and starts8 and failed takeoffs,9 in which rapid 
growth is followed by periods of relative 
stagnation.10 Contributing to this pattern is a lack 
of effective governance, in which reforms are 
stifled by entrenched elites who benefit from the 
status quo.11 Unless governance can be improved, 
2. Robert Looney and Robert McNab, “Pakistan’s Economic and Security Dilemma: Expanded Defense Expenditures and the Relative Governance 
Syndrome,” Contemporary South Asia (March 2008): 63.
3. Stephen Cohen, “Keeping Pakistan From Falling Apart,” World Politics Review (May 2011): 1.
4. C. Christine Fair, et al., Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State? (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2010), xv.
5. Ibid.
6. Shahid Javed Burki, “Roots of Terrorism,” Dawn, December 15, 2009.
7. Ibid.
8. Robert Looney, “Pakistan’s Economy: Achievements, Progress, Constraints and Prospects” in Pakistan: Founders’ Aspirations and Today’s 
Remedies, ed. Hafeez Malik (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 196−243.
9. Looney, “Failed Economic Take-offs and Terrorism in Pakistan: Conceptualizing a Proper Role for U.S. Assistance,” Asian Survey (November/
December 2004): 771−93.
10. Looney, “Failed Take-Off: An Assessment of Pakistan’s October 2008 Economic Crisis,” Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Brief No. 46, 
University of Bradford, April 21, 2009.
11. Burki, “Pakistan’s New Political Economy,” Business Standard, April 22, 2011.
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12. Looney and McNab, “Pakistan’s Economic and Security Dilemma: Expanded Defense Expenditures and the Relative Governance Syndrome,” 
Contemporary South Asia (March 2007): 63−82.
13. Griff Witte, “U.S. Aid Buys Little Goodwill: Pakistanis Say They See Scant Evidence of the Billions Spent,” The Washington Post, August 24, 2010, 
A1.
14. Fair, “A Better Bargain for Aid to Pakistan,” The Washington Post, May 30, 2009.
15. Ibid.
16. Ben Arnoldy and Assam Ahmed, “U.S. Cuts Aid to Pakistan: Six Key Questions,” The Christian Science Monitor, July 11, 2011.
17. Nancy Birdsall and Molly Kinder, The U.S. Aid “Surge” to Pakistan: Repeating a Failed Experiment? Lessons for U.S. Policymakers from the World 
Bank’s Social-Sector Lending in the 1990s (Working Paper No. 205, Center for Global Development, March 2010); Burki, “Living Without Foreign 
Assistance,” Dawn, May 23, 2011.
18. Carl J. Schramm, “Expeditionary Economics,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2010).
19. Ibid.
20. Nadeem ul Haque in Adil Najam, “Devising A New Growth Strategy for Pakistan (7): New Growth Framework Approved,” All Things Pakistan, 
May 29, 2011.
21. Ibid.
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it will continue to pose a formidable barrier to 
sustained growth.12 
It is becoming increasingly clear that traditional 
foreign aid is not the solution. Not only have 
massive infusions of foreign aid failed to bring 
stability to Pakistan or buy goodwill for the 
United States,13 but the way these programs 
are managed has corrupted and corroded the 
country’s institutions.14 The top-down nature 
of traditional aid programs has encouraged 
corruption and rent seeking, while lessening the 
need for the government to forge a bond with 
its citizens by raising revenues and redistributing 
those funds as services.15 Civilian aid programs 
have little effect on the overall Pakistani economy, 
as illustrated by a recent estimate that U.S. 
withdrawal of these funds would have only a 
0.14 percent impact on the GDP growth rate.16 
The outcomes of foreign aid have been so 
unsatisfactory that both donor and recipient 
groups agree that, in many respects, Pakistan 
would have been better off without them.17
While few hold out hope that traditional U.S. 
foreign aid can change the direction of events 
in Pakistan, the new area of Expeditionary 
Economics could potentially provide a basis 
for cooperation between the two countries in 
their mutual quest for stability. As described 
in Carl J. Schramm’s pathbreaking article, 
Expeditionary Economics begins with the 
premise that “economic growth is critical to 
establishing social stability, which is the ultimate 
objective of…counterinsurgency campaigns and 
disaster-relief efforts.”18 As Schramm notes, 
proven methods for achieving such economic 
growth already exist in “the entrepreneurial 
model practiced in the U.S. and elsewhere.”19 
Nadeem ul Haque of Pakistan’s Planning 
Committee laments that the “gyrations of 
politics and security have kept everyone fully 
engaged—in fact, more than fully—and issues 
of long-term development planning have been 
neglected not only by the media but in the public 
imagination.”20 He sees this situation as particularly 
ironic given that the state of the economy and 
its advancement are far more likely to affect 
politics and security than vice versa.21 One of a 
growing number of Pakistani economists who, 
like Schramm, champions the replacement of 
the country’s inefficient, state-run policies with 
entrepreneur-led growth, ul Haque observes: 
An unintended consequence of our past 
policies has been the stifling of internal 
markets, cities and communities, which 
play a critical role in fostering productivity, 
innovation and entrepreneurship and 
ultimately promote growth, prosperity and 
development. ... In the new development 
framework, the private sector should be the 
growth-driver in open market environment 
that rewards efficiency, innovation and 
entrepreneurship, while the government is 
facilitator that protects public interests and 
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rights, provides public goods, enforces laws, 
punishes exploitative practices, and operates 
with transparency and accountability.22
This sentiment lies at the core of the Pakistani 
Planning Commission’s New Growth Framework, 
which was formally adopted by the National 
Economic Council in May 2011. The framework 
represents a paradigm shift in Pakistan’s 
approach toward the economy. It proposes 
that the country move from the current state-
led model of development to one that relies 
on freely functioning markets with dynamic 
entrepreneurship playing the leading role in 
expanding investment, developing new areas 
of economic activity, and providing productive 
employment for the country’s rapidly burgeoning 
labor force. While the framework is intuitively 
appealing to professional economists, it is 
admittedly theoretical at this point and, as such, 
has drawn criticism that it offers a list of “what 
to do,” as opposed to “how to do.”23 Critics also 
note that it is vague regarding the sequencing of 
its policies and reforms24 and question whether 
Pakistan’s government has the ability and political 
will to implement such an ambitious agenda.25 
Criticisms aside, the key assumptions of the 
framework are basically sound. In fact, countries 
whose circumstances resembled those of Pakistan 
have implemented similar programs that initiated 
a cumulative process of growth and reform.26 
Many Central and Eastern European countries 
that successfully transitioned from communism 
followed programs that shared key assumptions 
and elements espoused by both the New Growth 
Framework and Expeditionary Economics. 
Pakistan’s New Growth Framework emphasizes 
theory, while Expeditionary Economics focuses 
on the nuts-and-bolts implementation of these 
economic principles by the military in conflict 
and post-conflict settings. However, in their 
basic philosophies and economic approaches, 
the two are essentially complementary. Both 
stress the importance of growth as a means 
to achieving objectives such as stabilization. 
Both see the entrepreneur as a key figure in the 
process of growth, with the state remaining in the 
background as a supporting player. Integrating 
the two approaches could potentially provide 
a blueprint for stimulating entrepreneurship-
led growth to improve stability and security 
in Pakistan and other developing countries. 
Key to integrating the New Growth Framework 
with Expeditionary Economics is the development 
of a model that places both on a sound empirical 
footing. As previously noted, the New Growth 
Framework is vague with regard to the proper 
sequencing of policies and reforms. Similarly, 
much of the literature on entrepreneurship, a key 
component of Expeditionary Economics, is vague 
or anecdotal in linking policy actions to new firm 
startups and increased entrepreneurial activity, 
making it difficult to transfer its strategies to 
different settings. 
A major goal of the present study is to develop 
an empirical model to serve as a starting point for 
designing development strategies for countries like 
Pakistan, where aid has produced few tangible gains 
and the economy has not been able to generate 
sustained periods of growth. More generally, 
the model seeks to integrate into Expeditionary 
Economics several related but diverse strands of 
research: the literature on governance and economic 
growth, factors underpinning entrepreneurship, 
and the diverse forces contributing to terrorism/
extremism. Ultimately, it is hoped that the analysis 
22. ul Haque, “Devising a Growth Strategy for Pakistan (2): Towards a New Development Approach,” All Things Pakistan, February 5, 2011.
23. Abid Hasan, “An Unorthodox Path to Prosperity,” The News, July 4, 2011.
24. Safiya Aftab, “The Elusive Quest for Sustainable Growth,” The Friday Times, May 6, 2011.
25. Pervez Tahir, “A ‘New’ Growth Strategy,” The Express Tribune, February 11, 2011.
26. See, for example, Oleh Havrylyshyn and Thomas Wolf, “Determinants of Growth in Transition Countries,” Finance & Development (June 1999); 
and Pradeep K. Mitra and Marcelo Selowsky, “Lessons from a Decade of Transition in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,” Finance & 
Development (June 2002).
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will yield a plan of action and a way of identifying 
the sequencing of reforms that will be applicable 
to a wide variety of conflict/post-conflict settings in 
the developing world.
To that end, this report begins with an 
overview of the various elements constraining 
Pakistan’s growth, as well as the factors leading 
up to Pakistan’s current crisis. Next, it offers 
a model that integrates the principles of the 
New Growth Framework with Expeditionary 
Economics and tests whether and how 
entrepreneurship-led development could initiate 
a virtuous circle of economic growth, reform, 
and reduced violence in Pakistan. Finally, it 
examines two contrasting solutions: expanded 
foreign aid programs and implementation of 
the New Growth Framework discussed above. 
Potential Constraints 
on Pakistan’s Economic 
Advancement and 
Entrepreneurial Activity
To develop an analytical framework for applying 
Expeditionary Economics to Pakistan and other 
conflict/post-conflict countries, it is first necessary 
to identify the constraints with the greatest 
potential to impede the country’s progress at 
each stage of development. In Pakistan’s case, 
the list is long. A cursory survey of the literature 
suggests a myriad of inhibiting factors. Those 
most frequently identified as key development 
constraints include (1) lack of competitiveness due 
to limitations in factors ranging from infrastructure 
to education to technological capacity, (2) limited 
governance in areas such as rule of law and 
anticorruption, and (3) insufficient economic 
reforms that hinder open markets and trade. 
Each of these broad categories is made up 
of a number of individual variables, which are 
explored in depth below. The examination of 
the variables is instructive, both in illuminating 
the wide range of constraints the Pakistani 
economy faces and in illustrating the diversity 
of opinion as to the paramount factor or factors 
that inhibit Pakistani growth and development. 
Potential  
Competitiveness Constraints
The World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Index (WEF GCI) provides an 
excellent starting point for examining Pakistan’s 
inability to sustain long-term growth. Drawing 
on the work of Harvard’s Michael Porter,27 the 
index provides a benchmark for identifying 
impediments to a country’s competitiveness.28 
The GCI takes into account macroeconomic as 
well as the core microeconomic foundations 
of national competitiveness, which it defines 
as “the set of institutions, policies, and factors 
that determine the level of productivity 
and thus income of a country.”29
The WEF’s approach depicts global 
competitiveness as a weighted average of many 
different components, each of which affects some 
aspect of competitiveness. These components 
fall into twelve main groups, or “12 pillars of 
competitiveness.”30 These pillars are: Institutions, 
Infrastructure, The Macroeconomic Environment, 
Health and Primary Education, Higher Education 
27. See, for example, Michael Porter, “Enhancing the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: The Current Competitiveness Index,” in The 
Global Competitiveness Report 2001−2002, ed. Klaus Schwab (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2001); and Michael Porter, “The Microeconomic 
Foundations of Prosperity: Findings from the Business Competitiveness Index,” in The Global Competitiveness Report 2007−2008, ed. Klaus 
Schwab (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2007). 
28. Xavier Sala-i-Martin, et. al., “The Global Competitiveness Index: Measuring the Productive Potential of Nations,” in The Global Competitiveness 
Report, 2007−2008, ed. Klaus Schwab (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2007), 3.
29. Klaus Schwab, preface to The Global Competitiveness Report 2010−2011, ed. Klaus Schwab (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2010), 4.
30. Ibid.
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and Training, Goods Market Efficiency, Labor 
Market Efficiency, Financial Market Development, 
Technological Readiness, Market Size, Business 
Sophistication, and Innovation. 
Following Porter’s31 earlier work, the WEF 
further assumes that countries progress through 
three distinct stages: (1) factor driven, (2) 
investment driven, and (3) innovation driven. 
Using regression analysis, the forum has found 
that certain pillars are more important at one 
stage than at others. Institutions, Infrastructure, 
Macroeconomic Stability, and Health and 
Primary Education are key in the factor-driven 
stage. Higher Education and Training, Goods 
Market Efficiency, Labor Market Efficiency, 
Financial Market Sophistication, Technological 
Readiness, and Market Size predominate 
during the efficiency-driven stage. Business 
Sophistication and Innovation play a critical 
role in the innovation-driven stage.
Drawing on this framework, the WEF is able 
to classify individual countries into one of these 
three stages. Each country is assigned to a 
development stage based on (1) its level of GDP 
per capita measured at market exchange rates— 
a proxy for wages (used by the WEF because 
internationally comparable data on wages and 
purchasing power parity are not available for all 
countries covered)—and (2) the extent to which 
countries are factor driven, as proxied by the share 
of exports of primary goods in total exports. 
The forum deems countries falling between 
two stages as “in transition.” As these countries 
develop, increasingly more weight is given to 
the pillars that will assure their competitiveness 
when they move on to the next development 
stage. In this way, the GFI rewards countries that 
do what is needed to ensure a smooth transition 
and penalizes those that fail to prepare for 
the next stage. Table 1 provides a summary of 
the latest (2010) World Economic Forum stage 
classifications. For the purposes of this report and 
its empirical model, the WEF stages have been 
relabeled as Groups 1 through 5, as indicated in 
parentheses under the main headings on Table 1.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, Pakistan’s progress 
toward improved competitiveness has been 
limited. According to the WEF’s 2010−2011 
Global Competitiveness Report: 
Pakistan falls to 123rd place, weakening across 
most areas measured by the GCI. Still at an 
early stage of development, the country will 
require efforts in particular to improve the 
basic determinants of its competitiveness, 
namely its institutions (112th), infrastructure 
(110th), and macroeconomic environment 
(133rd) as well as education at all levels.32 
 
31. Porter, “Enhancing the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity.”
32. The Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2010), 30.
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Fig. 1. Pakistan’s Progress  
in Improved Competitiveness
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Table 1. Countries at Various Stages of Development 2010–2011
Source: Xavier Sala-i-Martin, et al., “The Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011: Looking Beyond the Economic Crisis” in 
The Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011, ed. Klaus Schwab (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2010), 11.
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On this basis, Pakistan falls into Group 1, the 
initial, factor-driven stage of development. 
Since the early to mid-1990s, Pakistan’s 
competitive shortcomings have resulted in slowed 
economic growth relative to other developing 
countries in Asia (see Fig. 2). While the country 
managed to achieve a short spurt of growth in 
the early to mid-2000s, this expansion was largely 
consumption-demand-driven, rather than the result 
of a major increase in investment-led productivity. 
Even worse, this period of growth appears 
to have compounded many of the problems 
plaguing Pakistan today. While no detailed studies 
of income distribution are available for the last 
several years of Musharraf’s regime, Burki estimates 
that around 10 million Pakistanis benefitted 
from the economic growth and restructuring, 25 
million would have entered the system had it not 
been disrupted, and 45 million were completely 
ignored.33 Furthermore, he notes that regional 
inequality emerged from the Musharraf era, whose 
benefits were largely confined to the central and 
northern Punjab and large cities such as Islamabad, 
Lahore, Karachi, Faisalabad, and Gujranwala.34 
In addition to global competitiveness, the recent 
literature on failed states notes that development 
may be affected by deeper determinants of 
growth, including governance variables such as 
corruption, political stability, and the rule of law.35 
Another body of literature observes that the 
various dimensions of economic freedom (or the 
lack thereof) have had a profound effect on the 
progress of Pakistan and many other countries.36 
Such studies suggest that, besides the WEF’s twelve 
competitiveness components, there are additional 
factors that must be addressed before Pakistan 
can embark on a path of sustained growth. 
Limited Institutional 
Development: Governance
While rating countries on the basis of their relative 
progress in improving governance is inherently 
subjective, the World Bank37 regularly provides a 
set of rankings incorporating the full extent of our 
knowledge about this phenomenon. The World 
Bank dataset estimates six dimensions of 
governance for 213 economies over the period 
1996−2009. These dimensions are: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. 
The values for each of the governance figures 
range from a low of -2.5 to a high of +2.5, with a 
country sample mean of zero. 
The means for the five-group sample for 
2009 (Table 2) show a fairly steady progression 
on each governance dimension, from low 
for Group 1 to high for Group 5. The one 
notable exception to the pattern is a drop in 
the Voice and Accountability dimension as 
countries move from Group 1 to Group 2.
Pakistan scores low relative to other Group 1 
countries on most governance dimensions: -0.997 
on Voice and Accountability versus a Group 1 
average of -0.547; -2.756 on Political Stability/
33. Burki, “Arithmetic of Discontent,” Dawn, December 11, 2007.
34. Burki, “Reaching the Disadvantaged,” Dawn, December 18, 2007.
35. Dani Rodrik and Mark Rosenzweig, “Development Policy and Development Economics: an Introduction,” in Handbook of Development 
Economics, Vol. 5, eds. Dani Rodrik and Mark Rosenzweig (Amsterdam: North Holland, 2009).
36. See, for example, J. Gwartney, J. Hall, and R. Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World 2000 Annual Report (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2000).
37. World Bank Governance Indicators.
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Absence of Violence versus -0.685; -0.934 on 
Government Effectiveness versus -0.714; -0.925 on 
Rule of Law versus -0.761; and -1.097 on Control 
of Corruption versus -0.731. Pakistan surpasses the 
Group 1 mean only in its Regulatory Quality, on 
which it scored -0.499 versus -0.562 for Group 1 
countries as a whole. This score notwithstanding, 
poor governance places severe constraints on 
Pakistan’s growth. 
These constraints are further exacerbated by 
Pakistan’s high defense spending. Looney and 
McNab found that countries with high levels of 
governance and institutional quality, whose defense 
expenditures make up a relatively low share of 
GDP, may experience increased rates of growth 
if defense spending is expanded. Conversely, in 
countries like Pakistan with poor institutional 
quality as proxied by governance indicators 
such as voice and accountability, expanding 
already high levels of defense expenditures 
has a negative growth impact.38 As a result, 
without governance reforms, increased security 
spending to combat domestic terrorism could 
hamper Pakistan’s growth even more severely.
Interestingly, one school of thought contends 
that Pakistan’s deficient governance structures 
may themselves be a major contributing factor 
to terrorism and instability. In an early study of 
terrorism, Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova 
came to the surprising conclusion that a reduction 
in poverty in and of itself, or an increase in 
educational attainment, would not meaningfully 
reduce terrorism. Their main finding was that 
any connection between poverty, education, and 
38. Looney and McNab, “Pakistan’s Economic Security Dilemma.”
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World Economic 
Forum Stages
Voice Political 
Stability
Government 
Effectiveness
Regulatory 
Quality
Rule of Law Control of 
Corruption
1 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
-0.547
38
0.557
-0.685
38
0.813
-0.714
38
0.389
-0.562
37
0.443
-0.761
30
0.451
-0.731
38
0.388
Pakistan -0.997 -2.756 -0.933 -0.499 -0.925 -1.097
2 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
-0.739
25
0.649
-0.300
25
0.787
-0.267
25
0.582
-0.278
22
0.710
-0.415
22
0.552
-0.402
25
0.723
3 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
0.015
29
0.620
0.175
29
0.666
0.061
29
0.412
0.137
29
0.453
0.223
23
0.545
0.165
29
0.442
4 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
0.657
15
0.680
0.598
15
0.320
0.802
15
0.303
0.902
15
0.331
0.720
13
0.378
0.572
15
0.456
5 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
1.127
32
0.547
0.761
32
0.558
1.462
32
0.430
1.358
32
0.350
1.443
28
0.454
1.488
32
0.661
Total Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
0.051
139
0.932
-0.038
139
0.882
0.183
139
0.932
0.240
138
0.886
0.109
116
0.989
0.097
139
1.006
Table 2. Group Means on Governance Dimensions,  
World Economic Forum Development Stages, 2010–2011
Source: World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report, 2010–2011 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2010).
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terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably 
quite weak. Instead of viewing terrorism as a 
direct response to limited market opportunities 
or ignorance, they suggest that terrorism is 
a response to political conditions and long-
standing feelings, either perceived or real, of 
indignity and frustration.39 While subsequent 
studies have refined this position, Krueger 
and Maleckova’s findings are still the starting 
point in country-by-country assessments of 
the factors contributing to terrorism.40
Voice and Accountability
In the critical area of Voice and Accountability, 
Pakistan scores the lowest of the South Asian 
countries (see Fig. 3). Despite steady improvement 
in the post-Musharraf years, which saw the country 
rise from the 11th percentile in 2000 to 21st by 
2009, it still lagged below the 2009 Asian average41 
of 36th percentile and India’s 60th percentile.
Pakistan’s inability to achieve greater voice 
and accountability no doubt contributes to the 
country’s current economic malaise. Burki42 
contends that, as a result, the political system 
has not been able to find a way to reconcile the 
different economic interests of the country’s 
various competing groups. For example, the 
ruling Pakistan Peoples Party opposes the levying 
of taxes on its strong agricultural base, while 
the Karachi-based Muttahida Qaumi Movement 
argues against taxing urban services, and the 
Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) favors tax 
protection for the merchant class. The resulting 
political stalemate means that no new forms of 
direct taxation are available to the country.43 
Political Stability/Absence of Violence
Pakistan, like the other South Asian countries, 
is especially deficient in political stability/absence 
of violence (see Fig. 4). While all four South 
Asian countries score considerably below the 
Asian average (which is not particularly high by 
international standards), Pakistan’s score was 
by far the worst. From the 16th percentile in 
2000, Pakistan experienced a steady decline 
39. Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection? (Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, July 2002).
40. See also Krueger and Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives (Fall 
2003): 119−44.
41. Asian countries included in the World Bank governance data set are: Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Vietnam. 
42. Burki, “Pakistan’s New Political Economy,” Business Standard, April 22, 2011.
43. Ibid.
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on this measure until it eventually leveled off at 
the 1st percentile in 2007. Bangladesh ranked 
in the 8th percentile and Sri Lanka in the 12th. 
As might be anticipated, empirical evidence44 
suggests that addressing the country’s political 
instability is a prerequisite for further economic 
advancement. In addition, political instability 
and policy instability (see Fig. 5) ranked second 
and third (after corruption) as major concerns 
of businesses—no doubt contributing to the 
country’s low rates of private capital formation 
and inflows of direct private investment. 
Government Effectiveness
As shown in Fig. 6, Pakistan also scores low 
in government effectiveness, a key measure of 
the ability of countries to carry out development 
programs and effectively implement budgets. 
After averaging in the high thirties from 
2003−2007, the country had fallen to the 19th 
percentile by 2009, considerably below the Asian 
average of 51st and India’s 54th percentile. 
Economist Safiya Aftab notes some of the 
economic shortcomings that have stemmed 
from the lack of government effectiveness 
and decision making in recent years:
–  There is no energy plan (not even a 
conservation strategy) and little attempt to 
resolve the circular debt issue that plagues 
44. Muhammad Nadeem Qureshi, Karamat Ali, and Imran Rafi Khan, “Political Instability and Economic Development: Pakistan Time-Series 
Analysis,” International Research Journal of Finance and Economics (2010).
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Fig. 6. Government Effectiveness
Fig. 5. Pakistan: The Most Problematic Factors for Doing Business
Percent of responses
Note: From a list of fifteen factors, respondents were asked to select the five most problematic for doing business in their country and to rank them 
           between 1 (most problematic) and 5. The bars in the figure show the responses weighted according to their rankings.
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the sector. Worst of all, there seems to be no 
planning for crises—what happens if crude 
oil prices spike in the short run, for example?
–  Agricultural policy is supposed to be a 
provincial subject but the federal government 
doesn’t seem to have even a guiding 
framework for the sector. It’s not clear 
what the priorities are—is the priority to 
get the support price right or to invest in 
storage, for instance? Is the attempt to 
deregulate agricultural markets and set 
up commodity exchanges going to go 
anywhere, or has it been quietly shelved?
–  There is no attempt to introduce new 
forms of direct taxation. If there is any 
background work on the pros and 
cons of imposing agricultural income 
tax, or different forms of capital gains 
taxes, it has not been made public.
–  Cuts in expenditures have been made since 
the floods, but it is mainly development 
spending that has been axed, not 
nonsalary current expenditures.
–  Cutting the Public Sector Development 
Projects (PSDP) is probably the right 
way to go, but the government 
needs to be more transparent about 
what it’s going to axe and why.
–  In spite of the obvious fiscal crisis, there has 
been little attempt to restructure loss-making 
state-owned enterprises. The government 
has given in to pressure on at least two 
occasions when such attempts were made in 
the Karachi Electric Supply Company (KESC), 
though the government has a minority share 
in the utility and Pakistan International Airlines 
(PIA). For the KESC, the government’s action 
was unpardonable. Imposing on a private 
entity in order to reemploy staff on the basis 
of a 26 percent shareholding is absurd.45 
The precipitous drop in government 
effectiveness in recent years has led Stephen 
Cohen to conclude that the bureaucracy and 
other state structures are largely incapacitated and 
unable to respond to the country’s demographic 
and economic challenges. As a result, the 
country’s effective governance and ultimate 
viability now depend on a combination of massive 
foreign assistance and remittances of overseas 
Pakistanis.46 Pointing to Pakistan’s inclusion in 
the Top 10 of the Failed State Index, he predicts 
that the consequences will be “disastrous for 
future stability and governance, translating into a 
chronic incapacity to integrate security, political, 
economic, and administrative requirements in a 
central and long-term decision-making process.”47
Regulatory Quality
Pakistan’s performance (see Fig. 7) in improving 
regulatory quality has been somewhat better than 
its efforts in other governance areas. Starting from 
a low of the 18th percentile in 2004, the country 
had increased its score to the 33rd percentile by 
2009 (albeit down from 39th in 2006). This score 
was still somewhat below the Asian average of 
the 50th percentile and India’s 44th percentile. 
Burki notes that, even though Pakistan has done 
relatively well in improving regulatory quality in 
recent years, Pakistan’s regulatory system remains 
seriously underdeveloped for a country of its size. 
He argues that this situation stems from the fact 
that regulation in Pakistan has evolved more in 
response to special interests rather than to citizen 
needs and demands. While this pattern may 
change with the devolution of authority to the 
provinces, Burki cautions that the weaknesses in 
the existing regulatory system could complicate 
efforts to distinguish between functions that can 
45. Aftab, “Democracy, Three Years Later,” The Friday Times, April 1, 2011.
46. Stephen Cohen, “Keeping Pakistan From Falling Apart,” World Politics Review (May 2011): 1.
47. Ibid.
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50. Hassan Abbas, Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future, Asia Society Pakistan Study Group Report, May 2011.
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only be performed at the federal level and those 
that can be more efficiently handled locally.48 
Nadeem ul Haque cites regulatory quality 
as key to improving Pakistan’s productivity. 
Ul Haque notes that state enterprises like 
PIA, Pakistan Railways, and power sector 
organizations could improve productivity 
significantly, and thus contribute to national 
economic growth, through regulatory reforms.49�
Rule of Law
In the critical area of rule of law, Pakistan again 
falls short of other South Asian countries (see 
Fig. 8). The country ranked in the 31st percentile 
in 1996, declined to the 20th percentile in 2004, 
improved slightly to the 22nd percentile, then 
dipped to the 19th percentile by 2009. In 2009, 
the average for Asian countries as a whole was 
the 48th percentile, with India ranking in the 
56th, and Sri Lanka the 53rd. Between 2004 
and 2009, Bangladesh was able to increase its 
ranking from the 17th to the 28th percentile.
A study by the Asian Society highlights the 
importance of Pakistan’s improving its rule of 
law. The Asia Society’s Pakistan 2020 Study 
Group concluded that seven core issues needed 
to be addressed to ensure a sound future for 
the country by 2020. The recommendations 
included (1) strengthening democratic 
institutions, (2) strengthening the rule of law, 
(3) improving human development and social 
services, especially in health and education, 
(4) developing the energy infrastructure, (5) 
assisting the victims of the 2010 flood in their 
recovery, (6) improving internal security, and 
(7) advancing the peace process with India.50
Control of Corruption
Corruption, the final World Bank measurement 
of governance, has followed an erratic pattern in 
Pakistan during the past two decades (see Fig. 9). 
Starting in the 7th percentile in 1996, Pakistan 
gradually improved its score to the 30th percentile 
in 2003, declined again to the 14th and 15th 
percentiles in 2004 and 2005 respectively, and 
rose to the 26th percentile in 2007. Since then the 
country’s ranking has fallen (2009) to the 13th 
percentile, the lowest rank among the South Asian 
countries. For reference, the Asian average in 2009 
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was the 42nd percentile with India slightly higher at 
the 47th percentile. Ominously, the perception of 
corruption in Pakistan is worsening, with the police, 
land administration institutions, the judiciary, 
education, and local governments regarded as 
the most corrupt public-sector institutions.51
As shown in Fig. 5, businesses cite corruption 
as their major concern in doing business in 
Pakistan. Furthermore, according to Transparency 
International’s 2009 report, corruption prevents 
the “poor from participating equally in political 
decisions, from enjoying equality under the law, 
from seeing their needs reflected in policies and 
budgets and from accessing public goods and 
services … Decisions on food and energy security, 
natural resources, technology and investments 
are often compromised by corruption—with fatal 
consequences.”52 Significantly, the government 
of Pakistan has barred Transparency International 
from conducting surveys in the country for 
the organization’s next annual report.53�
Potential Economic 
Reform Constraints
In addition to arguments linking poor growth 
and development, instability, and even terrorism 
to governance failures, an equally valid claim 
can be made that these processes stem from a 
poor country record in economic reforms and 
associated progress toward economic freedom. 
Jennifer Bremer and John Kasarda’s terrorism 
and economic transitions model suggests that 
failure to enact needed economic reforms can 
result in inefficiencies and a lack of incentives for 
entrepreneurship while preventing more dynamic 
growth patterns. The resulting economic malaise 
spurs a vicious circle of instability, low investment, 
low growth, and further widespread discontent.54
Bremer and Kasarda view transition as occurring 
in three phases (see Fig. 10). The first phase 
typically begins when a low-income country 
rapidly begins to industrialize, launching an 
agrarian-industrial transition and the complex 
transformations in urbanization, income growth, 
and economic diversification that accompany it. 
A process similar but not identical to Rostow’s55 
takeoff occurs. If growth is sustained for a decade 
or more, the country may reach the second 
transition phase, in which industrial production 
per capita can increase as much as threefold, 
growth in low-value-added manufacturing is 
rapid and sustained, and rising incomes lead to 
the emergence of a middle class. Assuming this 
middle phase is successful, the country will likely 
reach the advanced phase in ten to twenty years. 
Countries that are currently in the advanced phase 
include Brazil, Poland, Russia, and Turkey.56
In contrast, Pakistan remains stalled in the 
first stage of this model, along with countries 
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51. Heritage Foundation, Economic Opportunity and Prosperity: The 2011 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 
2011).
52. Transparency International, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, (Berlin: Transparency International, 2009).
53. Siddiqi Hammad, “No Corruption Survey in Pakistan This Year,” Center for International Private Enterprise Development Blog, July 7, 2011, http://
www.cipe.org/blog/?p=8649.
54. Jennifer Bremer and John Kasarda, “The Origins of Terror: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Milken Institute Review (Fourth Quarter 2002): 
34−48.
55. W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
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57. Ibid.
58. Gwartney, et al., Economic Freedom of the World 2010 Annual Report.
59. Heritage Foundation, The 2011 Index of Economic Freedom.
60. Ibid.
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like Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. According to 
Bremer and Kasarda, these countries are trapped 
in this stage due to their failure to adopt choice-
based systems encompassing both market-based 
economic reforms and democratic political 
institutions and organizations. Without the 
adoption and proper sequencing of such reforms, 
they cannot progress up the ladder to more 
sophisticated production structures and, as a result, 
will face rising popular discontent and instability, 
along with the threat of terrorist insurrection.57
Limited Progress in  
Economic Freedom
No indices of the prevalence of choice-based 
systems exist. However, the Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom of the World58 and the Heritage 
Foundation and The Wall Street Journal’s Index 
of Economic Freedom59 are good proxies in that 
they measure the relative progress of countries in 
moving toward a deregulated, limited government, 
free-market environment. The Heritage Foundation 
dataset was chosen for this study because 
it contains a larger sample of countries.
To measure economic freedom, the Heritage 
Index takes ten different factors into account: 
(1) trade policy, (2) fiscal burden of government, 
(3) government intervention in the economy, (4) 
monetary policy, (5) banking and finance, (6) 
capital flows and foreign investment, (7) wage 
and prices, (8) property rights, (9) regulation, 
and (10) the informal market. These factors are 
designed to measure the openness of countries 
to competition, the degree of state intervention 
in the economy, and the ability of the courts to 
enforce rules and property rights. The Heritage 
Foundation emphasizes that countries must score 
well in all ten of the factors in order to improve 
their economic efficiency and, consequently, 
the living standards of their people.60
In the 2011 Heritage Foundation Index of 
Economic Freedom, Pakistan’s score was 55.1, 
compared to highest-ranking Hong Kong at 
89.7. Pakistan ranked twenty-fourth of forty-
one countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with 
an overall score that was below both the 
Source: Robert Looney, “Failed Economic Take-Offs and 
Terrorism in Pakistan,” Asian Survey (November/December 2004).
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world and regional averages. While Pakistan’s 
aggregate Economic Freedom ranking compared 
relatively favorably to those of Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, and India (see Fig. 11), the country made 
few gains in the overall liberalization of the 
economy, as indicated by the fact that its score 
in 2011 was slightly lower than in 1995.61
On the positive side, Pakistan has pursued 
reforms to improve its entrepreneurial environment 
and facilitate private-sector development. In 
addition, the country made significant gains in 
recent years in liberalizing restrictions on trade (see 
Fig. 12), although its progress in this area lagged 
behind India’s by a wide margin. However, in other 
areas, Pakistan’s progress lags considerably. Its tax 
system is complex and inefficient, though reforms 
have been undertaken to cut tax rates, broaden the 
tax base, and increase transparency. The judicial 
system suffers from a serious backlog and poor 
security, and corruption taints both the judiciary 
and civil service. In addition, restrictions on foreign 
investment and state involvement in the economy 
are serious drags on economic dynamism.62 
An examination of the group means by World 
Economic Forum groupings (Tables 3 and 4) shows 
a pattern similar to that found in the governance 
dimensions: countries show steady progress in 
economic reforms as they move from Group 1 to 
Group 5. The one major exception is in the fiscal 
area, where lower levels of government spending 
and taxes are considered freer. Given the expansion 
of government spending in the advanced countries, 
Groups 4 and 5 score low on this dimension.
In contrast with the governance indicators, 
Pakistan compares slightly favorably with other 
Group 1 countries. Overall, it scored 55.1 versus 
54.3 for Group 1 countries. For Business Freedom 
it scored 70.9 versus 55.5; for Fiscal Freedom, 
80.5 versus 77.1; and for Government Spending, 
88.8 versus 75.2. It should be noted, however, 
that the Heritage Foundation considers low 
government spending and minimal tax rates 
as a sign of economic freedom. While many 
would agree that this measure makes sense 
for developed economies, critics of Pakistan’s 
economic management contend it is precisely these 
attributes that have created the country’s current 
crisis of growing income inequality, crumbling 
infrastructure, and an educational system incapable 
of meeting the needs of a modern economy.
On the negative side, Pakistan scores below 
the Group 1 norm in the areas of Trade Freedom 
(67.0 versus 69.5 for Group 1 countries), Monetary 
Freedom (63.6 versus 70.0), Investment Freedom 
(40.0 versus 41.2), Financial Freedom (40.0 
versus 43.3), Property Freedom (30.0 versus 
30.2), Freedom from Corruption (24.0 versus 
27.0), and Labor Freedom (46.3 versus 57.6).
Deficiencies in Entrepreneurial 
Access to Capital
The Milken Institute’s Capital Access Index (CAI) 
provides an additional perspective on Pakistan’s 
progress in supporting entrepreneurship and a 
modern economy. This index scores the ability of 
entrepreneurs to gain access to financial capital 
in countries around the world. The CAI measures 
not only the breadth, depth, and vitality of capital 
markets, but also openness in providing access 
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
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Source: Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom database, 2010.
Source: Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom database, 2010.
World Economic 
Forum Stages
Overall 
Freedom 
Score
Business 
Freedom
Trade 
Freedom
Fiscal 
Freedom
Government 
Spending
Monetary 
Freedom
1 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
54.300
38
5.867
55.460
38
11.605
69.537
38
7.503
77.051
37
9.418
75.168
37
15.816
69.886
37
5.591
Pakistan 55.2 71.7 67.0 80.5 88.8 69.4
2 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
57.260
24
9.639
65.150
24
16.136
74.792
24
10.320
82.204
24
11.229
71.667
24
15.905
66.329
24
7.024
3 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
61.890
29
6.263
67.110
29
9.410
78.090
29
7.970
80.517
29
7.884
71.893
29
16.450
71.928
29
4.942
4 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
68.910
14
4.936
72.550
14
9.822
84.136
14
7.166
80.693
14
9.408
63.229
14
17.512
72.879
14
4.184
5 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
73.190
32
6.899
85.470
32
10.272
86.391
32
3.562
64.234
32
14.439
49.128
32
19.451
78.613
32
3.810
Total Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
62.330
137
10.057
68.380
137
15.860
77.696
137
9.818
76.059
138
12.693
66.496
136
19.661
72.055
138
6.649
World Economic  
Forum Stages
Investment 
Freedom
Financial 
Freedom
Property 
Rights
Freedom  
from 
Corruption
Labor 
Freedom
1 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
54.300
38
5.867
55.460
38
11.605
69.537
38
7.503
77.051
37
9.418
75.168
37
15.816
Pakistan 55.2 71.7 67.0 80.5 88.8
2 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
57.260
24
9.639
65.150
24
16.136
74.792
24
10.320
82.204
24
11.229
71.667
24
15.905
3 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
61.890
29
6.263
67.110
29
9.410
78.090
29
7.970
80.517
29
7.884
71.893
29
16.450
4 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
68.910
14
4.936
72.550
14
9.822
84.136
14
7.166
80.693
14
9.408
63.229
14
17.512
5 Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
73.190
32
6.899
85.470
32
10.272
86.391
32
3.562
64.234
32
14.439
49.128
32
19.451
Total Mean
Number of Countries
Std. Deviation
62.330
137
10.057
68.380
137
15.860
77.696
137
9.818
76.059
138
12.693
66.496
136
19.661
Table 3. Group Means on Economic Freedom Dimensions l,  
World Economic Forum Development Stages, 2010–2011
Table 4. Group Means on Economic Freedom Dimensions II,  
World Economic Forum Development Stages, 2010–2011
63. Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan Stability Hinges on Reform,” gulfnews.com, April 24, 2011.
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without discrimination, a measure of global 
progress in the democratization of capital.
The seven components of the CAI are:
–  Macroeconomic environment: the favorableness 
of conditions for running and financing a 
business, based on such variables as inflation, 
interest rates, tax rates, and financial 
sophistication relative to international norms; 
–  Institutional environment: the extent to 
which institutions support and enhance 
business financing activities, based on 
variables that include the enforceability 
of property rights, the impartiality of the 
judicial system, the efficiency of bankruptcy 
procedures, and the levels of corruption;
–  Financial and banking institutions: the 
involvement of deposit-taking institutions 
in financing businesses, based on such 
variables as the extension of credit to the 
private sector, the soundness of financial 
institutions, the ease of access to bank loans, 
and the efficiency of the banking system;
–  Equity market development: the importance 
of equity financing of business operations, 
based on such variables as stock market 
capitalization relative to GDP, stock market 
liquidity, and changes in the number of listings;
–  Bond market development: the importance 
of bond financing for businesses, based 
on variables such as the value of private 
and public bonds relative to GDP and 
securitized asset issuance relative to GDP;
–  Alternative sources of capital: the level of usage 
of diverse financing sources, such as venture 
capital, credit cards, and nonpublic stock 
offerings or other private placements; and
–  International funding: the availability of foreign 
capital to businesses in a particular country, 
based on such variables as the volatility of 
exchange rates, international reserve holdings, 
portfolio and foreign direct investment, capital 
inflows and outflows, and sovereign ratings. 
According to the 2009 CAI, Pakistan ranked 
seventy-fourth out of 122 countries with a score 
of 3.93. In contrast, India ranked forty-fourth, with 
a score of 5.51, Sri Lanka ranked seventy-second, 
and Bangladesh ranked eighty-fifth. While Pakistan 
showed some progress from 2002 to 2006, its 
scores have since been in decline, whereas India has 
had a fairly dramatic increase over time in this key 
measure (see Fig. 13). Pakistan did, however, make 
relatively good progress in several of the Capital 
Access subcomponents (Table 5), including equity 
market development (ranked fortieth) and bond 
market development (ranked forty-fifth). On the 
other hand, the country was considerably behind 
in macroeconomic environment (ranked 110th) 
and international funding (ranked ninety-third). 
In sum, the progress made by Pakistan 
in the critical areas of competitiveness, 
governance, economic reform, and capital access 
remains disappointing, with retrogressions 
occurring in several key areas. Even during 
periods of rapid growth, the country was 
unable to make significant gains. 
If the models of economic stagnation and 
terrorism developed by Bremer and Kasarda 
play out along expected lines, the country’s 
future is dire. The situation has been best 
summed up by long-time Financial Times 
columnist Farhan Bokhari. Observing the 
country’s ever-shifting political alliances and 
infighting, he notes that such developments:
…only work to reinforce the largely tainted 
view of Pakistan’s prevailing political order, 
built to protect and promote the country’s 
vested interests across its urban and rural 
belts. Pakistan’s survival, prosperity and 
stability depend fundamentally on the 
ability of its ruling class to reform the 
country on multiple fronts. Without giving 
a new direction to Pakistan’s economy 
backed by reforms surrounding internal 
management and governance, the country’s 
outlook will largely remain unchanged.63
Capital Access Index: Summary Rank Score
Pakistan 74 3.93
India 44 5.51
Sri Lanka 72 3.96
Bangladesh 85 3.48
Macroeconomic Environment
Pakistan 110 3.75
India 63 5.83
Sri Lanka 113 3.50
Bangladesh 99 4.17
Institutional Environment
Pakistan 70 4.82
India 71 4.76
Sri Lanka 56 5.35
Bangladesh 110 3.24
Financial and Banking Institutions
Pakistan 72 3.90
India 46 5.10
Sri Lanka 62 4.40
Bangladesh 69 4.00
Equity Market Development Rank Score
Pakistan 40 5.17
India 14 6.50
Sri Lanka 40 5.17
Bangladesh 33 5.50
Bond Market Development
Pakistan 45 4.25
India 33 5.25
Sri Lanka 76 2.50
Bangladesh 62 3.50
Alternative Sources of Capital
Pakistan 74 1.75
India 18 6.25
Sri Lanka 72 2.00
Bangladesh 86 0.75
International Funding
Pakistan 93 2.75
India 25 5.50
Sri Lanka 76 3.42
Bangladesh 97 2.50
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If the country is to move ahead, where should 
the emphasis lie in developing a reform strategy 
to overcome the impediments posed by the 
country’s governance/institutional structures? 
The next section addresses this issue through 
the development of an empirically based model 
structured to identify the nature and sequencing of 
the most urgent reforms. 
Constraints on Pakistan’s 
Growth Potential and 
Entrepreneurship
It is unrealistic to expect that the Pakistani 
government, or any government for that matter, 
could address all the potential constraints identified 
in the previous section. Hausmann, Rodrik, 
and Velasco suggest that a better approach is 
Pakistan
India Bangladesh Sri Lanka
Source: The Milken Institute, Capital Access Index, 2010.
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Fig. 13. Progress in  
Entrepreneurial Access to Capital
Source: Compiled from: James R. Barth, Tong Li, Wenling Lu, and Glen Yago, Capital Access Index 2009: Best Markets for Business Access to 
Capital (Santa Monica, CA: Milken Institute, April 2010).
Table 5. Financial Sector Development
64. Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrick, and Andres Velasco, “Getting the Diagnosis Right: A New Approach to Economic Reform,” Finance & 
Development (March 2006).
65. Preliminary analysis suggested that, while the Milken Institute Capital Access dataset provided some interesting insights to the Pakistani 
situation, because of its relatively narrow focus it did not contribute a significant amount of information over and above that provided by the 
other three datasets.
66. World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2010, which comprises the number of newly registered limited liability companies per 1,000 
working-age people (ages 15−64).
67. Data compiled in Friedrich Schneider and Andreas Buehn, “Shadow Economics and Corruption All Over the World: Revised Estimates for 120 
Countries,” Economics: the Open Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (October 27, 2009).
68. Ibid. 
69. Friedrich Schneider with Dominik Enste, Hiding in the Shadows: The Growth of the Underground Economy (Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund, 2002).
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to identify and address the one or two most 
binding present constraints. To this end, they 
propose that each country use a decision tree 
methodology (see Fig. 14) to identify binding 
constraints and policy options. Their framework 
focuses on the short term, identifying constraints 
as they emerge rather than attempting to 
anticipate future impediments to growth.64
While this approach provides a good starting 
point, the goal of the present study is to develop 
a model that addresses both entrepreneurship 
and growth, which are unlikely to face the 
same constraints simultaneously. Furthermore, 
given Pakistan’s history of stalled growth and 
failed takeoffs, it is crucial to identify the correct 
sequence of reforms necessary to firmly set the 
country on the path to development and keep it 
there. It is hoped that the model that emerges can 
offer direction, not only to Pakistan, but to broad 
classes of countries facing similar circumstances.
As the basis for the model, the World Economic 
Forum Competitiveness Indicators (WEF), the 
World Bank Governance Indicators (WB), and the 
Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom 
(EF) were merged into a single database.65 
Added to this were the World Bank’s database 
on entrepreneurial activity�66 and the size of the 
shadow economy (percent of GDP) in individual 
countries.67 The shadow economy is relatively 
large in Pakistan, averaging around 37.1 percent of 
GDP.68 It is included in part to track the country’s 
movement toward an efficient competitive 
economy, since the literature on entrepreneurship 
and growth stresses the necessity of transforming 
informal/shadow activities into formal entities with 
higher productivity and taxpaying potential.69
C o n s t r a i n t s  o n  P a k i s t a n ’ s  
G r o w t h  P o t e n t i a l  a n d  E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p
Source: Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik, and Andres Velasco, “Getting the Diagnosis Right,” Finance and Development (March 2006).
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Fig. 14. Growth Constraint Decision Tree
Time for a checkup
A decision tree, such as the one below, can help identify the biggest obstacles to growth. 
Problem: Low levels of private investment  
and entrepreneurship
70. See the classic work by Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, “A Factor Analysis of the Interrelationship Between Social and Political Variables 
and Per Capita Gross National Product,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (November 1965) for a discussion of the method and interpretation of 
results. See also their “Factor Analysis and Development,” Journal of Development Economics (August 1982).
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Key Dimensions of Growth 
Potential and Entrepreneurship
The first step in the analysis was to assess the main 
trends in the data, as well as to confirm the profile 
of Pakistan’s development situation that we have 
seen thus far. The key questions examined were:
1.  Of the twenty-eight potential constraints on 
growth contained in the merged database, how 
many distinct phenomena are represented? 
2.  Do the same elements impact increased 
entrepreneurship and growth potential, or is 
each linked to a separate set of conditions? 
3.  What is Pakistan’s relative attainment on these 
key dimensions? 
To answer these questions, a factor analysis 
was undertaken for the total sample of country 
groupings (Groups 1-5), as well as for sequential 
subsets of country groupings through the five 
stages of development.70 
The rotated factor matrix (Table 6) identified 
five main trends or dimensions in the combined 
data set for the total sample of countries. Factor 1 
variables were loaded on a dimension associated 
with economic freedom; Factor 2 variables on fiscal 
freedom and state of governance; Factor 3 variables 
on health/education/trade; Factor 4 variables on 
labor efficiency/freedom and institutions; and 
Factor 5 variables on a competitiveness dimension.
In the total sample of countries, growth 
potential is most highly associated with several 
components of Factor 5, the competitiveness 
dimension, namely, the WEF’s (a) market size, 
(b) macroeconomic environment, (c) business 
sophistication, and (d) infrastructure. However,  
a sharp picture does not emerge, as growth 
potential is also associated to a lesser extent with 
Factors 1-4.
Entrepreneurship does not seem to be highly 
associated with any of the main trends in the data. 
Instead, this key variable is fairly equally associated 
with Factor 1 (economic freedom), Factor 3 
(health/education), and Factor 4 (labor market 
freedom and efficiency). Although causation 
cannot be firmly established at this point, a safe 
assumption is that entrepreneurship is positively 
affected by improved economic freedom, better 
health/education, and progress in freeing labor 
markets, a key area in facilitating the establishment 
of new firms. The mean factor scores by WEF 
country groupings suggests development through 
the various stages is associated with steady 
improvements in governance (Factor 2), and to a 
lesser extent economic freedom (Factor 1), with 
a sizeable jump in governance occurring when 
countries transition from Group 4 to Group 5. 
In terms of creating an environment for the 
growth of entrepreneurship, Pakistan scores 
slightly above Group 1 countries on economic 
freedom but has one of the lowest attainments 
on health/education and is below the group 
average in labor market development. The 
country appears to be well above the Group 1 
mean for potential growth (Factor 5), a finding 
that may be due simply to the dominance of 
market size in contributing to this dimension.
It is likely that many of the key linkages 
between growth potential and entrepreneurship 
are blurred due to the great diversity of country 
environments. To sharpen the focus, a more 
detailed analysis was undertaken of the various 
country subgroupings. For our purposes, a key 
issue is that of facilitating Pakistan’s movement up 
the development ladder. Do the factors impacting 
growth and entrepreneurial activity in these 
individual groupings differ from those for the total 
sample of countries, and if so, which are critical? 
The biggest difference between the patterns for 
Group 1 and Group 2 countries and those of the 
total country sample is a sharpening in the area 
of growth potential. When the factor analysis is 
confined to Group 1 and Group 2 countries (Table 
7), the growth potential term (Factor 1) is narrowly 
   Main Dimensions
Key Indicators Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
 Economic Fiscal/ Health/ Labor Market Growth/
 Freedom Governance Education Efficiency Competitiveness
EF Investment Freedom 0.803 0.198 0.362 0.131 0.013
EF Financial Freedom 0.701 0.162 0.317 0.166 0.145
EF Monetary Freedom 0.725 0.240 0.026 0.067 0.301
EF Overall Economic Freedom Score 0.710 0.100 0.352 0.524 0.213
WB Regulatory Quality 0.662 0.382 0.438 0.313 0.284
WEF Financial Market Development 0.481 0.246 -0.024 0.443 0.473
EF Business Freedom 0.428 0.247 0.363 0.389 0.203
EF Fiscal Freedom -0.211 -0.807 -0.017 0.118 -0.328
EF Government Spending -0.075 -0.748 -0.382 0.118 0.082
WEF Innovation 0.223 0.613 0.176 0.387 0.545
WB Rule of Law 0.482 0.574 0.412 0.352 0.294
WB Voice and Accountability 0.537 0.570 0.448 -0.008 0.147
EF Property Rights 0.532 0.566 0.292 0.378 0.307
WB Control of Corruption 0.506 0.555 0.373 0.402 0.278
EF Freedom From Corruption 0.507 0.546 0.362 0.399 0.307
WEF Technological Readiness 0.440 0.512 0.471 0.295 0.403
WB Government Effectiveness 0.493 0.503 0.426 0.374 0.375
WEF Health and Primary Education 0.161 0.304 0.747 0.181 0.367
EF Trade Freedom 0.492 0.087 0.715 0.088 0.072
WEF Higher Education and Training 0.219 0.485 0.624 0.267 0.442
WB Political Stability 0.382 0.355 0.596 0.273 0.098
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.202 0.109 0.210 0.818 0.093
EF Labor Freedom 0.007 -0.195 0.043 0.759 -0.056
WEF Institutions 0.354 0.505 0.172 0.618 0.310
EF Goods Market Efficiency 0.495 0.356 0.183 0.580 0.416
Entrepreneurship 0.395 0.136 0.423 0.455 -0.074
WEF Market Size -0.021 0.191 0.033 -0.160 0.812
WEF Macroeconomic Environment 0.353 -0.101 0.298 0.116 0.647
Growth Potential 0.304 0.414 0.388 0.402 0.639
WEF Business Sophistication 0.329 0.529 0.186 0.303 0.636
WEF Infrastructure 0.341 0.416 0.490 0.279 0.542
Notes: Extraction Method: IBM SPSS19.0 Principle Component Analysis. Rotation Method Variamax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation 
converged in nine iterations. WEF = World Economic Forum Dataset; EF = Heritage Economic Freedom Dataset; WB = World Bank Governance 
Dataset. Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES) 2010.
Country Factor Scores
Pakistan -0.323 -0.036 -2.532 -0.648 0.183
Difference: Pakistan – Group 1 0.122 0.060 -1.244 -0.580 0.948
Mean Factor Scores 
Group 1 Countries -0.445 -0.096 -1.288 -0.068 -0.765
Group 2 Countries -0.741 -0.616 -0.022 -0.133 -0.013
Group 3 Countries -0.148 -0.613 0.078 -0.234 0.132
Group 4 Countries 0.346 -0.254 0.882 -0.158 -0.256
Group 5 Countries 0.567 0.878 0.425 0.334 0.444
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Table 6. Factor Analysis: Growth Potential/Entrepreneurship Linkages—
Total Sample of Countries (loadings on principal dimensions)
     Main Dimensions
Key Indicators Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8
 Growth Governance Competi- Economic Labor Democracy Macro- Political 
 Education  tiveness Freedom Freedom  Economic Stability
     Efficiency  Stability 
WEF Health and Primary Education 0.899 0.065 -0.041 0.000 -0.124 0.171 -0.122 0.093
WEF Higher Education and Training 0.896 -0.131 0.167 -0.058 0.025 -0.269 -0.019 0.022
EF Infrastructure 0.879 0.222 0.221 0.097 -0.046 0.008 0.019 -0.105
Growth Potential 0.796 0.195 0.454 -0.105 0.032 0.163 0.210 0.083
WEF Technological Readiness 0.651 0.115 0.497 0.163 0.126 -0.171 0.261 -0.103
EF Trade Freedom 0.594 -0.311 -0.357 0.300 0.096 -0.138 0.151 0.214
WB Control of Corruption 0.019 0.920 -0.006 0.147 -0.081 -0.019 0.004 0.040
WB Rule of Law 0.132 0.819 0.216 0.154 -0.015 -0.124 -0.006 0.114
EF Freedom from Corruption -0.069 0.808 -0.074 0.203 -0.209 -0.255 0.136 -0.196
WB Government Effectiveness 0.391 0.700 0.190 0.377 0.050 0.013 -0.026 0.073
WEF Institutions -0.025 0.681 0.251 -0.185 0.389 0.338 -0.132 0.201
EF Property Rights -0.092 0.660 0.336 0.272 -0.084 -0.274 -0.164 0.019
WEF Business Sophistication 0.349 0.051 0.879 -0.060 -0.154 0.038 0.052 -0.084
WEF Financial Market Development 0.044 0.055 0.875 0.231 0.065 -0.099 -0.120 0.012
WEF Innovation 0.065 0.284 0.767 -0.345 -0.049 0.034 0.138 0.111
WEF Goods Market Efficiency 0.103 0.393 0.724 0.178 0.218 0.187 -0.041 -0.031
WEF Market Size 0.296 -0.117 0.561 -0.243 -0.318 -0.068 0.194 -0.270
EF Fiscal Freedom 0.076 -0.448 -0.480 0.286 0.088 0.193 -0.354 0.117
EF Financial Freedom 0.035 0.082 -0.101 0.890 -0.045 -0.105 -0.007 0.162
EF Overall Freedom Score 0.044 0.172 -0.106 0.870 0.310 0.222 0.052 -0.132
EF Investment Freedom -0.082 0.184 0.002 0.853 0.093 0.052 0.003 0.042
WB Regulatory Quality 0.229 0.312 0.238 0.802 0.140 -0.142 -0.005 0.018
EF Labor Freedom -0.006 -0.097 0.010 0.150 0.849 0.018 -0.110 -0.156
WEF Labor Market Efficiency -0.089 -0.072 0.007 0.105 0.834 0.013 -0.034 0.393
Entrepreneurship 0.474 -0.067 -0.273 0.445 0.522 -0.179 0.173 -0.116
EF Government Spending -0.075 -0.216 0.216 0.232 -0.186 0.779 0.196 -0.057
WB Voice and Accountability 0.049 0.242 0.305 0.269 -0.283 -0.705 -0.045 0.147
WEF Macroeconomic Environment 0.309 -0.102 0.046 -0.077 -0.060 0.267 0.828 0.148
EF Monetary Freedom -0.412 0.086 0.074 0.467 -0.171 -0.035 0.628 -0.089
WB Political Freedom 0.249 0.300 -0.273 0.252 0.199 -0.155 0.160 0.590
EF Business Freedom 0.258 0.270 -0.374 0.362 0.349 0.295 0.015 -0.482
Notes: Extraction Method: IBM SPSS 19.0 Principle Component Analysis. Rotation Method Variamax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation 
converged in fifteen iterations. WEF = World Economic Forum Dataset; EF = Heritage Economic Freedom Dataset; WB = World Bank 
Governance Dataset. Entrepreneurship: World Bank Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES) 2010.
Factor Scores
Pakistan -0.912 -0.863 0.658 -0.301 -0.916 0.675 -0.780 -2.520
Difference: Pakistan - Group 1 -0.307 -0.740 0.717 -0.159 -0.850 0.748 -0.655 -2.627
Mean Factor Scores 
Group 1 Countries -0.605 -0.123 -0.059 -0.142 -0.066 -0.073 -0.125 0.107
Group 2 Countries 0.907 0.185 0.089 0.212 0.099 0.109 0.187 -0.160
Difference: Group 2 - Group 1 1.512 0.308 0.148 0.354 0.165 0.182 0.312 -0.267
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Table 7. Factor Analysis: Growth Potential/Entrepreneurship Linkages—
Country Groups 1 and 2 (loadings on principal dimensions)
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    Main Dimensions
Key Indicators Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7
 Institutions/ Economic Democracy Labor Health Macro- Government  
 Competitiveness Freedom Political Efficiency/ Education Economic Spending 
  Governance Stability Freedom  Stability  
WB Government Effectiveness 0.864 0.025 0.136 0.069 0.088 0.009 -0.044
EF Property Rights 0.837 0.239 0.105 -0.115 0.002 -0.189 0.100
WEF Institutions 0.807 0.133 -0.225 0.117 0.248 0.192 -0.125
Growth Potential 0.804 -0.356 -0.069 0.131 0.054 0.384 0.147
WEF Goods Market Efficiency 0.802 0.231 0.005 0.221 0.072 0.187 0.225
WEF Business Sophistication 0.801 -0.273 0.080 -0.155 -0.171 0.162 0.252
WB Rule of Law 0.787 0.163 0.187 -0.008 0.351 -0.049 -0.250
WEF Financial Markets Development 0.764 0.123 0.174 0.103 -0.410 0.179 0.066
EF Freedom From Corruption 0.762 0.347 0.268 -0.200 0.204 -0.091 -0.078
WEF Infrastructure 0.718 -0.238 -0.175 0.096 -0.114 0.022 0.154
WEF Innovation 0.702 -0.613 -0.041 0.018 0.017 0.194 -0.082
WB Control of Corruption 0.693 0.370 0.360 -0.251 0.268 -0.123 -0.173
WEF Technological Readiness 0.566 -0.119 0.449 0.053 -0.048 0.378 -0.247
EF Investment Freedom -0.034 0.837 0.316 -0.117 0.003 -0.028 -0.028
EF Overall Economic Freedom 0.390 0.827 0.166 0.203 0.083 0.022 0.233
EF Financial Freedom 0.206 0.746 0.250 0.153 -0.225 -0.045 0.168
EF Business Freedom 0.295 0.666 -0.337 0.182 -0.065 0.086 -0.142
WEF Market Size 0.081 -0.610 -0.023 -0.349 -0.232 -0.039 0.289
WEF Higher Education and Training 0.424 -0.610 0.162 0.243 0.284 0.092 -0.334
WB Regulatory Quality 0.544 0.609 0.425 0.194 -0.047 -0.051 0.040
EF Monetary Freedom 0.142 0.562 0.077 -0.256 0.055 0.435 0.030
WB Voice and Accountability 0.130 0.166 0.840 -0.072 -0.148 -0.101 -0.150
Entrepreneurship 0.187 0.140 0.602 0.202 0.470 0.029 -0.070
EF Trade Freedom -0.228 0.421 0.598 0.289 0.143 -0.027 0.349
WB Political Stability 0.143 0.069 0.509 0.160 0.239 0.426 -0.304
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.059 -0.014 0.182 0.889 0.079 0.126 0.059
EF Labor Freedom 0.071 0.169 -0.065 0.836 0.164 -0.147 -0.182
WEF Health and Primary Education 0.224 -0.291 -0.013 0.152 0.718 0.022 -0.103
EF Fiscal Freedom -0.206 0.426 0.156 0.401 0.582 0.025 0.204
WEF Macroeconomic Environment 0.095 0.006 -0.068 0.002 -0.024 0.864 0.189
EF Government Spending 0.261 0.135 -0.208 -0.101 -0.057 0.240 0.736
Notes: Extraction Method: IBM SPSS 19.0 Principle Component Analysis. Rotation Method Variamax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation 
converged in eighteen iterations. WEF = World Economic Forum Dataset; EF = Heritage Economic Freedom Dataset; WB = World Bank 
Governance Dataset. Entrepreneurship: World Bank Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES) 2010.
Mean Factor Scores 
Group 2 Countries -0.453 -0.089 -0.666 0.150 -0.079 -0.303 0.243 
Group 3 Countries 0.226 0.011 0.333 -0.075 0.040 0.151 -0.121 
Difference: Group 3 - Group 2 0.679 0.133 0.999 -0.225 0.119 0.454 -0.364
Table 8. Factor Analysis: Entrepreneurship Linkages—Country Groups 2 and 3 
(loadings on principal dimensions)
71. As noted below, the WEF basis of classifying industries into its five groups is heavily dependent on per-capita incomes in defined ranges.
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associated with health and primary education, 
followed by higher education and training and 
then infrastructure. In terms of economic freedom, 
openness to trade is also an important element 
contributing to a country’s growth potential at 
this stage of development. Several elements of 
competitiveness reflected by Factor 3—business 
sophistication, financial market development, and 
innovation—are important to a lesser extent.
In Factor 1, the elements that contribute 
to expanded growth potential, Pakistan is 
considerably below the Group 1 norm. While 
it surpasses even Group 2 countries on the 
competitiveness elements of Factor 3, this 
advantage may be due to the country-size 
component of this factor. The significant 
difference in the means of Group 1 and Group 
2 for Factor 1 suggests that forces in addition to 
increased per-capita income71 are instrumental 
in allowing countries to make this transition.
As in the case of the total country sample, the 
factors determining entrepreneurship for Groups 
1 and 2 are more diffuse and less focused. Factor 
1, education/health, was a main contributor to the 
expansion of new firms, just as it was to growth 
potential. Also important were Factor 4, economic 
freedom, and Factor 5, improved labor market 
efficiencies and freedom. Pakistan scores poorly 
on each of these elements, especially education/
health and the development of labor markets, 
suggesting that improvements in health and in all 
levels of education are critical for increased growth.
While Pakistan’s immediate focus must be 
on accomplishing the transition to Group 2, it 
should also anticipate the challenges involved 
in transitioning to the higher groups. Toward 
this end, a factor analysis of WEF country 
Groups 2 and 3 was undertaken that produced 
several interesting pattern shifts (Table 8). 
Replacing Group 1 countries with Group 
3 countries in the sample shows that country 
growth potential is increasingly influenced by 
several components of governance and economic 
freedom. Growth potential loads heavily on 
Factor 1, institutions and competitiveness. While 
competitiveness elements such as business 
sophistication and financial market development 
play an important role, so also do the World 
Bank’s government effectiveness, rule of law, 
and control of corruption. Similarly, the Heritage 
Foundation measures of property rights and 
freedom from corruption now figure importantly 
in contributing to improved growth potential.
The factors associated with entrepreneurship 
also shift. For the Group 2 and 3 countries, 
entrepreneurship loads heaviest on Factor 3, 
democracy/political stability, with trade freedom 
also sharing a strong association with increased 
entrepreneurial activity. While health and 
education (Factor 5) remain important, they 
become secondary to institutional development 
as countries move up the development ladder.
For Groups 1 and 2, the seven factors  
(Table 7) show the largest differences in Factors 
1 and 3, which are associated with growth 
and entrepreneurship. This result implies that 
countries face a number of significant barriers 
in transitioning from Group 2 to Group 3.
The observed patterns of growth potential 
and entrepreneurship carry over to the analysis 
of country Groups 3 and 4. Growth potential is 
most strongly associated (Table 9) with variables 
reflecting governance—especially government 
effectiveness, rule of law, political stability, 
freedom from corruption, and property rights—
together with elements of competitiveness, 
such as the WEF’s measure of institutions.
Entrepreneurship in Group 3 and 4 countries 
has its greatest loadings on Factor 2, economic 
freedom/democracy and Factor 5, health and 
education. Key elements in Factor 2 include 
investment freedom, voice and accountability, trade 
freedom regulatory quality, and overall economic 
freedom. This pattern demonstrates a subtle shift 
from fairly loose associations between these factors 
and entrepreneurship for Groups 1 and 2, to a 
strengthening of governance factors for Groups 2 
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     Main Dimensions
Key Indicators Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8
 Growth Economic Fiscal Business/ Health/ Labor Government Monetary 
 Institutions Freedom Freedom Financial Education Market Spending Freedom
 Competi- Democracy  Freedom  Freedom  
 tiveness
WEF Institutions 0.888 -0.047 0.348 0.068 0.052 0.055 0.038 0.050
Growth Potential 0.849 -0.163 -0.140 0.299 0.181 0.256 0.081 0.041
WB Government Effectiveness 0.828 0.372 -0.096 0.241 0.193 0.035 -0.055 -0.033
EF Freedom From Corruption 0.822 0.483 0.137 -0.035 0.050 -0.074 0.012 -0.063
EF Property Rights 0.789 0.446 -0.053 0.035 0.100 0.000 0.168 0.040
WB Rule of Law 0.784 0.447 0.079 0.077 0.246 0.096 -0.200 -0.080
WEF Innovation 0.768 -0.281 -0.300 0.037 0.303 0.223 -0.060 -0.069
WB Control of Corruption 0.759 0.567 0.132 -0.122 0.085 -0.026 -0.038 -0.060
WEF Goods Market Efficiency 0.758 0.096 0.298 0.305 0.062 0.262 0.199 0.222
WEF Business Sophistication 0.729 -0.097 -0.299 0.153 -0.025 0.150 0.341 0.164
WEF Infrastructure 0.704 -0.080 -0.120 -0.465 0.181 -0.051 -0.022 -0.201
WEF Financial Market Development 0.701 0.032 -0.048 0.223 -0.290 0.199 0.040 0.404
WB Political Stability 0.496 0.370 0.213 -0.096 0.251 0.000 -0.420 -0.021
EF Investment Freedom 0.053 0.881 0.282 0.066 0.092 -0.193 0.071 0.087
WB Voice and Accountability 0.075 0.832 -0.204 -0.161 0.154 0.002 -0.129 0.041
EF Trade Freedom -0.007 0.811 0.201 0.157 -0.066 0.125 -0.172 0.071
WB Regulatory Quality 0.511 0.703 0.006 0.322 0.080 0.213 -0.073 0.146
EF Overall Economic Freedom Score 0.472 0.637 0.330 0.271 -0.049 0.115 0.340 0.163
Entrepreneurship 0.080 0.509 0.091 -0.090 0.400 0.505 0.031 -0.207
EF Fiscal Freedom -0.111 0.056 0.841 0.170 -0.027 0.230 0.088 -0.044
WEF Market Size -0.004 -0.292 -0.791 -0.022 -0.189 0.055 0.093 -0.089
WEF Macroeconomic Environment 0.355 -0.144 0.140 0.747 -0.145 0.095 -0.074 -0.075
EF Business Freedom 0.165 0.228 0.086 0.632 0.168 0.005 0.284 0.114
EF Financial Freedom 0.033 0.561 -0.001 0.622 -0.141 0.229 -0.003 0.214
WEF Health and Primary Education 0.118 0.037 0.160 -0.038 0.889 0.057 -0.071 0.050
WEF Higher Education and Training 0.547 0.092 -0.201 -0.010 0.646 0.127 -0.263 -0.135
WEF Technological Readiness 0.482 0.378 -0.148 0.341 0.541 0.026 -0.265 0.078
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.251 0.113 0.149 0.295 0.175 0.803 -0.053 0.059
EF Labor Freedom 0.233 -0.168 0.529 -0.138 -0.223 0.530 -0.091 0.001
EF Government Spending 0.141 -0.097 0.005 0.056 -0.158 -0.062 0.895 0.009
EF Monetary Freedom 0.026 0.163 0.039 0.040 0.027 -0.016 0.024 0.945
Notes: Extraction Method: IBM SPSS 19.0 Principle Component Analysis. Rotation Method Variamax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation 
converged in fifteen iterations. WEF = World Economic Forum Dataset; EF = Heritage Economic Freedom Dataset; WB = World Bank 
Governance Dataset. Entrepreneurship: World Bank Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES) 2010.
Mean Factor Scores 
Group 3 Countries -0.295 -0.313 0.023 -0.107 -0.120 0.062 0.280 0.084
Group 4 Countries 0.710 0.752 -0.055 0.257 0.288 -0.148 -0.671 -0.203
Difference: Group 4 - Group 3 1.005 1.066 -0.078 0.365 0.408 -0.210 -0.951 -0.287
Table 9. Factor Analysis: Growth Potential/Entrepreneurship Linkages—
Country Groups 3 and 4 (loadings on principal dimensions)
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   Main Dimensions
Key Indicators Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6
 Competitiveness Fiscal Financial/ Macro- Market Entre-
 Governance/ Freedom Investment Economic Size preneurship
 Economic  Freedom Environment  Monetary
 Freedom     Freedom
EF Freedom From Corruption 0.916 0.033 0.192 0.141 -0.127 0.118
WB Control of Corruption 0.904 0.005 0.188 0.176 -0.170 0.141
WB Government Effectiveness 0.887 -0.008 0.199 0.274 -0.084 0.201
WB Rule of Law 0.881 -0.100 0.239 0.183 -0.156 0.155
WEF Higher Education and Training 0.879 -0.154 0.059 -0.058 0.063 0.053
Growth Potential 0.873 0.046 0.140 0.351 0.266 -0.046
EF Property Rights 0.850 -0.015 0.255 0.120 -0.088 0.249
WEF Innovation 0.843 -0.106 0.045 0.159 0.319 -0.086
WEF Institutions 0.838 0.123 0.120 0.365 -0.175 0.054
WEF Business Sophistication 0.826 -0.174 0.074 0.250 0.342 -0.060
WEF Technological Readiness 0.806 0.137 0.318 0.080 0.015 0.006
WEF Goods Market Efficiency 0.790 0.249 0.198 0.397 -0.018 0.172
EF Business Freedom 0.757 0.066 0.192 -0.144 0.162 0.270
WEF Health and Primary Education 0.745 -0.211 0.003 -0.168 0.085 0.467
WEF Infrastructure 0.738 0.073 0.131 0.131 0.368 0.043
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.683 0.487 0.277 0.166 -0.057 0.048
WB Regulatory Quality 0.651 0.048 0.529 0.372 -0.049 0.256
EF Total Economic Freedom Score 0.631 0.551 0.426 0.142 -0.039 0.238
EF Government Spending -0.040 0.828 0.023 0.031 -0.054 0.063
EF Fiscal Freedom -0.337 0.824 -0.123 -0.075 -0.207 -0.047
WB Voice and Accountability 0.395 -0.663 0.293 -0.172 -0.117 0.251
EF Labor Freedom 0.276 0.625 0.085 0.143 0.053 0.111
EF Investment Freedom 0.263 0.017 0.838 0.025 -0.052 0.015
EF Financial Freedom 0.231 -0.051 0.740 0.261 0.164 0.197
WEF Macroeconomic Environment 0.169 0.109 0.193 0.836 0.077 -0.120
WEF Financial Market Development 0.427 0.165 0.123 0.760 -0.032 0.278
WEF Market Size 0.252 -0.108 0.000 0.141 0.821 -0.115
WB Political Stability 0.510 0.022 -0.209 0.192 -0.530 0.005
EF Trade Freedom 0.154 -0.043 0.445 0.129 -0.479 -0.158
Entrepreneurship 0.177 0.311 0.251 -0.041 -0.303 0.719
EF Monetary Freedom 0.348 -0.174 -0.045 0.288 0.407 0.626
Notes: Extraction Method: IBM SPSS19.0 Principle Component Analysis. Rotation Method Variamax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation 
converged in nine iterations. WEF = World Economic Forum Dataset; EF = Heritage Economic Freedom Dataset; WB = World Bank Governance 
Dataset. Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES) 2010.
Mean Factor Scores 
Group 4 Countries -1.033 0.458 -0.722 -0.018 -0.534 -0.624
Group 5 Countries 0.344 -0.153 0.024 0.006 0.178 0.208
Difference: Group 5 - Group 4 1.377 -0.611 0.746 0.024 0.712 0.832
Table 10. Factor Analysis: Growth Potential/Entrepreneurship Linkages—
Country Groups 4 and 5 (loadings on principal dimensions)
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and 3, to a greater balance between governance 
and economic freedom for Groups 3 and 4.
Also striking is the apparent weakening of the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and the 
factors surrounding growth competitiveness,  
which is fairly strong for Groups 1 and 2 but 
declines significantly as countries move to Groups 
2−3 and 3-4.
For Groups 4 and 5 (Table 10), growth potential 
is defined by a balance of competitiveness, 
governance, and economic freedom. In contrast, 
entrepreneurship has little or no connection 
with these variables, loading weakly on the final 
factor, which is comprised largely of measures of 
monetary freedom.
The factor analysis by country groupings 
demonstrates the shifts that occur in the 
linkages associated with growth potential and 
entrepreneurship as the development process 
proceeds. In terms of growth potential, this pattern 
begins with a limited number of basic elements 
such as infrastructure and education/health, 
proceeds next to institutions associated with 
improved governance, then to governance and 
more economic freedom, and culminates in a final 
balance among all three elements: competitiveness, 
governance, and economic freedom.
In terms of entrepreneurship, the pattern moves 
from weak association with these three groups 
of variables in early stages of development, to 
stronger links with democracy and political stability, 
to economic freedom, and finally to a state in 
which there are few links to competitiveness/
governance and economic freedom. These patterns 
suggest a tentative working hypothesis comprising 
three parts: (1) If entrepreneurship affects national 
growth potential, it does so indirectly through 
its influence on the institutional environment; (2) 
Once under way, entrepreneurship appears to 
spur a process of governance reform and further 
economic liberalization; and (3) This process is 
largely complete once countries reach stages 
4 and 5, in which factors outside the variables 
examined here may play a more significant role.
Discriminant Analysis— 
Key Constraints on Group 
Advancement
A pattern noted above was that the differences 
in means between groups was most significant 
on those factors loading heavily on growth 
potential and entrepreneurship (with the 
exception of entrepreneurship and Factor 5, 
growth competitiveness, for the Group 1 and 2 
countries). This pattern suggests that a relatively 
small number of variables associated with 
growth potential and entrepreneurship may 
control movement from one stage to another.
The WEF uses two criteria for allocating 
countries into five stages of development. The 
first is the level of GDP per capita at market 
exchange rates as a proxy for wages, since 
comparable data on wages are not available for 
all countries. The second is the extent to which 
countries are factor driven, as proxied by the 
share of minerals in total exports. For example, 
countries in which minerals make up 70 percent 
or more of average total exports over a five-
year period are deemed to be factor driven.72�
The inability of Pakistan and many other 
countries to sustain steady growth raises the 
more interesting question of whether there 
are specific impediments that might cause a 
country to get “stuck” in one of these groups. 
Rather than per-capita income and primary 
product exports, are there specific governance/
competitiveness/economic freedom variables 
associated with each pair of country groupings 
that constrain or delay the development process 
until threshold levels are reached? While not 
conclusive proof of causation, if the hypothesis 
derived from the factor analysis is correct, we 
should expect to find that entrepreneurship 
72. World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2010−2011, 10.
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is a leading force in affecting—either directly 
or indirectly—these key transition variables.
To test this theory, a discriminant analysis73 
was undertaken to determine which variables 
were statistically significant in correctly 
classifying countries in each of the five WEF 
stages of development. The discriminant 
results start with Groups 1 and 2, with group 
membership gradually expanded to see 
which variables come into play when more 
developed countries are added to the sample.
Of the twenty-eight possible profiling elements 
(Table 11), only two were statistically significant 
in separating Group 1 and 2 countries into 
distinct groupings based on competitiveness/
governance/economic freedom. In order of 
importance, these were the WEF’s innovation 
variable and the WEF’s infrastructure variable, 
73. Adelman and Morris, “Performance Criteria for Evaluating Economic Development Potential: An Operational Approach,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics (May 1968). See also Randal Jones, “A Model For Predicting Expropriation in Latin America Applied to Jamaica,” Colombia Journal 
of World Business (Spring 1980) for an early example of the use of factor and discriminant analysis in classifying countries and assessing the 
requirements for progression from one group to another. 
 Mean Values Discriminant Groups
Discriminating Variables in Order of Importance Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Pakistan
Groups 1 and 2 (82.5% Placement as WEF) Pakistan 90.4% in WEF Group 1
WEF Innovation 2.79 2.96 - - - 3.03
WEF Infrastructure 2.53 3.72 - - - 2.75
Groups 1, 2 and 3 (75.0% Placement as WEF) Pakistan 89.4% in WEF Group 1
WEF Technological Readiness 2.77 3.27 3.67 - - 2.94
WEF Innovation 2.80 2.95 3.05 - - 3.03
WEF Infrastructure 2.52 3.66 3.80 - - 2.75
WB Voice and Accountability -0.49 -0.95 0.16 - - -1.00
Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 (72.9% Placement as WEF) Pakistan 94.1% in WEF Group 1
WEF Technological Readiness 2.78 3.29 3.67 4.38 - 2.94
WEF Innovation 2.79 2.95 3.13 3.36 - 3.03
WEF Infrastructure 2.50 3.71 3.80 4.64 - 2.75
WEF Growth Potential 3.47 4.07 4.19 4.36 - 3.48
WB Voice and Accountability -0.53 -0.93 0.22 0.72 - -1.00
Groups 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (75.0% Placement as WEF) Pakistan 97.0% in WEF Group 1
WEF Innovation 2.77 2.99 3.05 3.31 4.68 3.03
WEF Higher Education and Training 2.85 3.81 4.11 4.70 5.41 2.91
WEF Infrastructure 2.46 3.62 3.77 4.63 5.61 2.75
EF Monetary Freedom 70.67 65.03 72.66 73.67 79.14 69.40
WEF Growth Potential 3.44 4.06 4.12 4.36 5.09 3.48
WB Rule of Law -0.77 -0.46 -0.21 0.72 1.53 -0.93
Notes: SPSS 19.0 Stepwise Multiple Discriminant Analysis. WEF = World Economic Forum Competitiveness data; EF = Heritage House Economic 
Freedom Dataset; WB = World Bank Governance Dataset.
Table 11. Country Group Profiles
30
E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p  a n d  t h e  P r o c e s s  o f  D e v e l o p m e n t : 
A  F r a m e w o r k  f o r  A p p l i e d  E x p e d i t i o n a r y  E c o n o m i c s  i n  P a k i s t a n
R e g r e s s i o n  A n a l y s i s — K e y  L i n k a g e s  
S u r r o u n d i n g  E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p
which together correctly classified 82.5 percent 
of countries into their original WEF groupings. 
In the case of both variables, Group 2 countries 
had a significantly higher level of attainment, 
especially with regard to infrastructure. Pakistan 
was classified as a Group 1 country with a 90.4 
percent probability. It scored higher than even 
Group 2 countries in innovation but, although 
above the Group 1 mean, was considerably 
underdeveloped in infrastructure. These results 
indicate that infrastructure must be developed 
before Pakistan can move to the next stage.
Broadening the discriminant analysis to include 
Group 3 countries produced another distinct 
profiling pattern. Four variables were statistically 
significant in profiling the combined group of 
countries into their three original WEF groupings 
with 75.0 percent accuracy. In declining order 
of statistical importance, these variables were: 
the WEF’s measure of technological readiness, 
the WEF’s innovation, the WEF’s infrastructure, 
and finally, the World Bank’s measure of 
governance, voice, and accountability.
Pakistan was again classified as a Group 1 
country with 89.4 percent confidence. As in the 
previous analysis, it matches up well in terms 
of innovation, with a score in the range of the 
Group 3 mean. The question of whether the 
country will be able to overcompensate in this area 
sufficiently to move up the development ladder 
is problematic, given that it currently scores only 
slightly better than the mean for Group 1 not only 
in infrastructure, but in technological readiness. 
In contrast to the other key transition variables 
which show steady progress as countries move to 
higher groupings, the mean group scores for voice 
and accountability decline for Group 2 countries 
before increasing dramatically for Group 3. This 
finding suggests that authoritarian regimes may 
be more adept at initiating a growth process, 
and, in fact, Pakistan’s economic performance 
has been somewhat better under military rule. On 
the other hand, reliance on the military has not 
resulted in sustained growth. Instead, it appears 
that economic reforms, like the ones undertaken 
by Musharraf in the early and mid-2000s, simply 
give rise to a new set of rent seekers intent on 
maintaining the status quo.74 Pakistan’s democratic 
institutions and government accountability must be 
immediately strengthened to sustain its progress 
from Group 1 to Group 2, with governance reforms 
continuing to facilitate the transition to Group 3. 
When the discriminant sample is further 
expanded to include countries in Group 4, the 
WEF’s overall growth potential variable contributes 
to group delineation. Most—72.9 percent—of the 
countries are correctly classified in their respective 
WEF groupings, with Pakistan having a 94.1 
percent probability of remaining in Group 1. 
Pakistan’s score on the WEF’s growth potential 
term is very slightly above the Group 1 norm.  
The growth potential term increases steadily 
from the lower to the higher country groupings, 
suggesting that a balanced attainment of many 
of the competitiveness measures is critical for 
continued advancement. 
Finally, when the discriminant analysis included 
all five groups, six key variables were identified 
that create a distinct competitiveness/governance/
economic freedom environment. In addition to 
innovation, infrastructure, and growth potential, 
the WEF’s higher education and training, the World 
Bank’s rule of law, and the Heritage Foundation’s 
monetary freedom variables are statistically 
significant in correctly classifying 75 percent of 
the countries in their original WEF groupings. 
Pakistan is classified with a 97 percent probability 
as belonging in Group 1.
Regression Analysis—Key Linkages 
Surrounding Entrepreneurship
The factor and discriminant analyses were  
both suggestive of the potentially key role 
entrepreneurship could play in Pakistan’s transition 
to higher levels of development. However, while 
identifying key relationships, neither method is 
capable of definitively establishing causal 
relationships between entrepreneurship and  
other key competitiveness/governance/economic 
74. Burki, Changing Perceptions, Altered Reality: Pakistan’s Economy Under Musharraf, 1999−2006 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Chapter 1.
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freedom variables. To fill this gap, a regression 
analysis was performed on the country sample to 
determine the specific factors that contribute to 
entrepreneurship.
Factors Contributing to  
Increased Entrepreneurship
Neoliberal thought holds that economic 
liberalization and increased efforts in many of the 
WEF’s categories of competitiveness can produce 
an environment conducive to the creation of new 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SME).75 This 
assumption underlaid the neoliberal approach to 
economic reform in Chile after the fall of Allende 
and later became the rationale for many of the 
dramatic market reforms in post-communist Eastern 
and Central Europe.76 To test this proposition, 
the World Bank’s entrepreneurship (density) was 
regressed on the WEF’s competitiveness data set 
and the Heritage Foundation economic freedom 
variables. As with the discriminant analysis, the 
analysis began with Groups 1 and 2 and gradually 
expanded to the more developed country 
groupings.77 
Of the competitiveness and economic freedom 
variables, entrepreneurship in Group 1 and 2 
countries responded most strongly to improved 
trade freedom, followed by business freedom 
(Table 12). These two variables alone accounted 
75. Looney, “Neo-liberalism” in vol. 2 of Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy, ed. R.J. Barry Jones (London: Routledge, 2001), 
1106−1110.
76. Ibid.
77. The results presented here are for countries classified in groups derived from the discriminant analysis. However, a separate analysis of the WEF 
groupings produced a similar set of findings.
 Standardized t Sig df R R Square Adjusted
 Coefficient      R Square
WEF Group 1
Model 1
EF Trade Freedom 0.584 3.447 0.002 23 0.584 0.341 0.312
Model 2
EF Trade Freedom 0.565 4.114 0.000 - - - -
EF Business Freedom 0.495 3.598 0.002 22 0.765 0.585 0.547
WEF Groups 1 and 2
Model 1
WEF Technological Readiness 0.503 3.775 0.000 42 0.503 0.253 0.236
Model 2
WEF Technological Readiness 0.547 4.330 0.000 - - - -
EF Fiscal Freedom 0.326 2.583 0.013 41 0.598 0.358 0.327
Model 3
WEF Technological Readiness 0.540 4.451 0.000 - - - -
EF Fiscal Freedom 0.266 2.131 0.039 - - - -
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.260 2.101 0.042 40 0.649 0.422 0.378
Model 4
WEF Technological Readiness 0.381 2.762 0.009 - - - -
EF Fiscal Freedom 0.254 2.119 0.041 - - - -
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.273 2.301 0.027 - - - -
EF Freedom From Corruption 0.292 2.132 0.039 39 0.734 0.482 0.429
Notes: Stepwise Regression Model: IBM SPSS 19.0; Country groupings are those from the World Economic Forum Competitiveness 2010–2011 
dataset. Dataset: WEF = World Economic Forum Competitiveness dataset; EF = Heritage Economic Freedom Dataset; Entrepreneurship Data: 
World Bank Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES) 2010. Regression Analysis was entrepreneurship on the combined WEF and EF datasets. Additional 
Variables: SHADOW = Size of the Shadow Economy (% GDP), WEFGROUP, group prediction dummy.
Table 12. Determinants of Entrepreneurial Activity (Stepwise Regression)
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for more than 50 percent of the fluctuation in 
entrepreneurship for this sample of countries. 
When the sample was expanded to include 
Group 3, competitiveness factors, especially 
technological readiness and labor market efficiency, 
took on an added role in facilitating increased 
entrepreneurial activity. Increased freedom from 
corruption was also a critical factor at this juncture. 
With the addition of Group 4, economic 
freedom factors were replaced by variables 
reflecting increased competitiveness, namely, 
technological readiness and labor market 
efficiency (Table 13). The fact that the economic 
liberalization reforms impact primarily the early 
stages of development was confirmed through 
regressions omitting Group 1 countries. For 
Groups 2, 3, and 4 and for 3 and 4 separately, only 
competitiveness variables—technological readiness 
and labor market efficiency—were statistically 
significant in affecting entrepreneurship. 
With market liberalization, especially trade 
freedom and business freedom reforms, 
opportunities for increased entrepreneurial activity 
open up for Group 1 countries like Pakistan. 
Further increases in market reforms do not appear 
as critical in influencing movement through 
the higher stages of development, although a 
key market reform may still make a significant 
contribution to the growth of new firms.
However, while market reform can produce 
increased entrepreneurial activity, it is not sufficient 
in and of itself to create a virtuous circle of 
continued growth and reform. This fact is illustrated 
by the vicious circle in which Pakistan now finds 
itself, despite the market reforms undertaken by 
Musharraf, as well as by the experiences of several 
of the former European communist countries.
Entrepreneurship and Governance
The literature suggests that the impact of 
entrepreneurship on governance may play a major 
role in determining whether initial growth will be 
 Standardized t Sig df R R Square Adjusted
 Coefficient      R Square
WEF Group 1, 2, 3 and 4
Model 1
WEF Technological Readiness 0.616 5.585 0.000 51 0.616 0.380 0.367
Model 2
WEF Technological Readiness 0.563 5.260 0.000 - - - -
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.269 2.508 0.015 50 0.670 0.449 0.427
WEF Groups 2, 3 and 4
Model 1
WEF Technological Readiness 0.529 3.373 0.001 36 0.529 0.280 0.260
Model 2
WEF Technological Readiness 0.383 2.703 0.011 - - - -
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.378 2.663 0.012 35 0.633 0.401 0.367
WEF Groups 3 and 4
Model 1
WEF Labor Market Efficiency 0.536 3.237 0.003 26 0.536 0.287 0.260
Notes: Stepwise Regression Model: IBM SPSS 19.0; Country groupings are those from the World Economic Forum Competitiveness 2010–2011 
dataset. Dataset: WEF = World Economic Forum Competitiveness dataset; EF = Heritage Economic Freedom Dataset; Entrepreneurship Data: 
World Bank Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES) 2010. Regression Analysis was entrepreneurship on the combined WEF and EF datasets. Additional 
Variables: SHADOW = Size of the Shadow Economy (% GDP), WEFGROUP, group prediction dummy.
Table 13. Determinants of Entrepreneurial Activity cont’d. (Stepwise Regression)
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devolve into a vicious, or evolve into a virtuous, 
circle of development.78 According to Havrylyshyn 
and Wolf,79 a vicious circle is precipitated when 
the first set of entrepreneurs and other vested 
interests, content merely to live off their rents, 
derail the development process by blocking 
further governance (and possibly economic) 
reforms. In contrast, the creation of a virtuous 
circle requires entrepreneurs to take a longer-
term view and push for continuing reforms to 
spur additional growth and increase profits.80 
The analysis thus far appears to support 
this theory. The components of governance, 
with the exception of voice and accountability, 
show steady improvement as countries move 
to higher and higher groupings. The level of 
improvement for both the WEF groups and 
the discriminant groupings used in this model 
appears to peak as countries move from Group 
3 to Group 4 (Table 14). Control of corruption 
also improves markedly at this level, but reaches 
its maximum rate of improvement during 
the transition from Group 4 to Group 5. 
Are these patterns, in fact, associated with 
pressure from entrepreneurial groups for further 
reforms, especially in the area of governance? 
After controlling for what appears to be a 
normal improvement in governance as countries 
develop, does increased governance contribute an 
additional amount to the upgrading of national 
WEF Country Group Voice and Political Government Regulatory Rule of Control of
 Accountability Stability Effectiveness Quality Law Corruption
Group 1 -0.547 -0.685 -0.714 -0.562 -0.760 -0.732
Group 2 -0.739 -0.300 -0.267 -0.278 -0.394 -0.403
Difference: Group 2 - Group 1 -0.192 0.385 0.447 0.284 0.366 0.329
Group 3 0.015 -0.176 0.016 0.137 -0.178 -0.165
Difference: Group 3 - Group 2 0.754 0.124 0.283 0.415 0.216 0.238
Group 4 0.657 0.598 0.802 0.902 0.715 0.572
Difference: Group 4 - Group 3 0.642 0.774 0.786 0.765 0.893 0.737
Group 5 1.127 0.761 1.462 1.358 1.436 1.488
Difference: Group 5 - Group 4 0.470 0.163 0.660 0.456 0.721 0.916
Discriminant Country Group Voice and Political Government Regulatory Rule of Control of
 Accountability Stability Effectiveness Quality Law Corruption
Group 1 -0.535 -0.694 -0.751 -0.569 -0.774 -0.737
Group 2 -0.638 -0.279 -0.340 -0.374 -0.455 -0.481
Difference: Group 2 - Group 1 -0.103 0.415 0.411 0.195 0.319 0.256
Group 3 -0.083 -0.299 0.008 0.165 -0.215 -0.201
Difference: Group 3 - Group 2 0.555 -0.020 0.348 0.539 0.240 0.280
Group 4 0.650 0.577 0.789 0.889 0.719 0.557
Difference: Group 4 - Group 3 0.733 0.876 0.781 0.724 0.934 0.758
Group 5 1.200 0.769 1.561 1.419 1.530 1.629
Difference: Group 5 - Group 4 0.550 0.192 0.772 0.530 0.811 1.072
Notes: Data from World Bank Governance Indicators dataset for 2009.
Table 14. Governance Patterns by Country Grouping (Group Means)
78. From somewhat different perspectives, this theme is touched upon in William Baumol, Robert Litan, and Carl Schramm, Good Capitalism, Bad 
Capitalism and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), and Raghuram Rajan, Saving Capitalism from 
the Capitalists (New York: Crown Business, 2003).
79. Havrylyshyn and Wolf, “Determinants of Growth in Transition Countries.”
80. Ibid.
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governance dimensions? If a pattern exists, it may 
do so with a lag due to the time it takes to realize 
major changes in areas like rule of law or control 
of corruption. Thus, we would expect major 
gains in governance to follow somewhat behind 
flurries of increased entrepreneurial activity.
Regression analysis was used to identify 
possible linkages between improved levels of 
governance and entrepreneurship. Because there 
appears to be a normal progression of regression 
improvement by group (again with voice and 
accountability the exception), a control stage 
dummy variable was included as an independent 
variable—assuming values of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 
5 to reflect the various country groupings. 
For the regressions involving the WEF stages, 
these values replicate the country groupings. 
In a similar fashion, for the analysis of the 
progression of governance improvement through 
the discriminant stages, the dummy assumed 
the value of each of the assigned groupings. 
For the WEF Groups 1 and 2 (Table 15), there 
are very weak linkages between entrepreneurship 
and increased levels of governance, with slight 
improvements occurring in the areas of political 
stability and regulatory quality. For the other 
measures of governance, no statistically significant 
linkages were found.
The picture improves somewhat for countries 
in Groups 2 and 3. For these countries, expanded 
entrepreneurship results in improved governance, 
Governance Measures Standardized t Sig R Square
 Coefficient   Adjusted
WEF Country Groups 1 and 2
Voice and Accountability No Variables Statistically Significant
Political Stability
  Entrepreneurship 0.376 2.184 0.031 0.141
Government Effectiveness
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.418 2.475 0.019 0.146
Regulatory Quality
  Entrepreneurship 0.444 2.619 0.014 0.168
Rule of Law No Variables Statistically Significant
Control of Corruption No Variables Statistically Significant
WEF Country Groups 2 and 3
Voice and Accountability
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.376 2.504 0.017 -
  Entrepreneurship 0.331 2.208 0.034 0.288
Political Stability
  Entrepreneurship 0.500 3.368 0.002 0.228
Government Effectiveness
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.408 2.608 0.013 0.142
Regulatory Quality
  Entrepreneurship 0.478 3.171 0.003 0.205
Rule of Law
  Entrepreneurship 0.476 3.160 0.003 0.204
Control of Corruption
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.402 2.855 0.007 -
  Entrepreneurship 0.387 2.746 0.100 0.373
Notes: Stepwise Regression—Dependent Variables listed in order of entry. Data: Governance measures World Bank Governance Indicators; 
Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2020. All data is for 2009.
Table 15. Entrepreneurship and Improved Governance: WEF Country Groupings
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with the exception of government effectiveness. 
However, as indicated by the adjusted r2 term, 
these linkages are not particularly strong. 
Entrepreneurial linkages improve dramatically 
for countries in WEF Groups 3 and 4 (Table 16). 
Again, entrepreneurship is statistically significant 
for all categories of governance, with the exception 
of government effectiveness. More importantly, 
in contrast to the previous groupings, the 
adjusted r2 values move into the 40 percent and 
50 percent range, with the exception of voice 
and accountability. That is, entrepreneurship 
accounts for nearly half the observed fluctuations 
in governance after controlling for the normal 
patterns of improvement.
Finally, countries in Groups 4 and 5 (Table 
17) show few linkages between improved levels 
of governance and increased entrepreneurial 
activity. Entrepreneurship is statistically significant 
only in the case of regulatory quality, and 
even here it is a secondary factor after taking 
into account the progression of stages. 
A slightly different pattern emerges when 
countries are examined in the discriminant 
analysis framework. Again, there are few 
linkages for Groups 1 and 2 (Table 18), outside 
political stability and regulatory quality, between 
expanded entrepreneurship and higher levels 
of governance. The linkages that do occur 
are extremely weak and barely significant. 
Linkages strengthen somewhat, especially in the 
area of voice and accountability, once countries 
reach Groups 2 and 3. Here entrepreneurship, 
along with the stage progression term, accounts 
for more than 60 percent of the variance 
across countries in voice and accountability. 
More importantly, for countries in these 
groups, entrepreneurship has a statistically 
significant link to all governance measures.
In sharp contrast to the findings reported above 
for the WEF stages, countries in discriminant 
Groups 3 and 4 show no statistically significant 
linkages with entrepreneurship (Table 19). In 
all cases, the discriminant stage dummy has 
high levels of statistical significance for all 
measures other than voice and accountability.
Another sharp contrast occurs between 
the two country grouping systems for Groups 
Governance Measures Standardized t Sig R Square
 Coefficient   Adjusted
WEF Country Groups 3 and 4
Voice and Accountability
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.376 2.504 0.017 -
  Entrepreneurship 0.331 2.208 0.034 0.288
Political Stability
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.376 2.504 0.017 -
  Entrepreneurship 0.331 2.208 0.034 0.288
Government Effectiveness
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.418 2.475 0.019 0.146
Regulatory Quality
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.376 2.504 0.017 -
  Entrepreneurship 0.331 2.208 0.034 0.288
Rule of Law
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.376 2.504 0.017 -
  Entrepreneurship 0.331 2.208 0.034 0.288
Control of Corruption
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.376 2.504 0.017 -
  Entrepreneurship 0.331 2.208 0.034 0.288
Notes: Stepwise Regression—Dependent Variables listed in order of entry. Data: Governance measures World Bank Governance Indicators; 
Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2020. All data is for 2009.
Table 16. Entrepreneurship and Improved Governance: WEF Country Groupings cont’d.
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Governance Measures Standardized t Sig R Square
 Coefficient   Adjusted
WEF Country Groups 4 and 5
Voice and Accountability
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.395 2.552 0.012 0.156
Political Stability No Variables Statistically Significant
Government Effectiveness
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.510 4.743 0.000 0.355
Regulatory Quality
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.418 2.998 0.005 0.284  
  Entrepreneurship 0.296 2.124 0.040 -
Rule of Law
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.621 4.882 0.000 0.369
Control of Corruption
  WEF Stage Group Dummy 0.545 4.008 0.000 0.279
Notes: Stepwise Regression—Dependent Variables listed in order of entry. Data: Governance measures World Bank Governance Indicators; 
Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2020. All data is for 2009.
Table 17. Entrepreneurship and Improved Governance: WEF Country Groupings cont’d.
Governance Measures Standardized t Sig R Square
 Coefficient   Adjusted
Discriminant Analysis Country Groups 1 and 2
Voice and Accountability No Variables Statistically Significant
Political Stability
  Entrepreneurship 0.376 2.184 0.037 0.141
Government Effectiveness No Variables Statistically Significant
Regulatory Quality
  Entrepreneurship 0.444 2.619 0.014 0.168
Rule of Law No Variables Statistically Significant
Control of Corruption No Variables Statistically Significant
Discriminant Analysis Country Groups 2 and 3
Voice and Accountability
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.679 6.326 0.000 -
 Entrepreneurship 0.294 2.741 0.010 0.617
Political Stability
  Entrepreneurship 0.500 3.368 0.002 0.228
Government Effectiveness
  Entrepreneurship 0.361 2.256 0.031 0.105
Regulatory Quality
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.313 2.128 0.041 0.280  
  Entrepreneurship 0.407 2.761 0.009 -
Rule of Law
  Entrepreneurship 0.476 3.160 0.003 0.204
Control of Corruption
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.293 2.043 0.049 0.316
 Entrepreneurship 0.456 3.178 0.003 -
Notes: Stepwise Regression—Dependent Variables listed in order of entry. Data: Governance measures World Bank Governance Indicators; 
Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2020. All data is for 2009.
Table 18. Entrepreneurship and Improved Governance: Discriminant Analysis Country Groupings
37
E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p  a n d  t h e  P r o c e s s  o f  D e v e l o p m e n t : 
A  F r a m e w o r k  f o r  A p p l i e d  E x p e d i t i o n a r y  E c o n o m i c s  i n  P a k i s t a n
E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p  a n d  G o v e r n a n c e
Governance Measures Standardized t Sig R Square
 Coefficient   Adjusted
Discriminant Country Groups 3 and 4
Voice and Accountability
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.560 3.823 0.001 0.292
Political Stability
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.689 5.378 0.000 0.458
Government Effectiveness
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.877 10.337 0.000 0.762
Regulatory Quality
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.796 7.435 0.000 0.622  
Rule of Law
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.893 11.222 0.000 0.791
Control of Corruption
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.812 7.868 0.000 0.649
Notes: Stepwise Regression—Dependent Variables listed in order of entry. Data: Governance measures World Bank Governance Indicators; 
Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2020. All data is for 2009.
Table 19. Entrepreneurship and Improved Governance: Discriminant Analysis Country Groupings cont’d.
4 and 5. As noted, there was only a weak 
linkage between entrepreneurship and 
regulatory quality for countries in WEF Groups 
4 and 5. In the discriminant country scheme 
(Table 20), entrepreneurship forms a highly 
significant link to four areas of governance: 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption.
What might account for these differences 
between country grouping schemes? As with 
governance (Table 14), entrepreneurial activity 
increases as countries move through the sequence 
of groupings (Table 21). However, increases in 
entrepreneurship between stages vary somewhat 
by grouping scheme. For the WEF classification 
framework, the highest percent increase in 
entrepreneurship occurs between Groups 2 
and 3, with a marked falloff in entrepreneurial 
activity between Groups 3 and 4. In the case 
of the discriminant country scheme, a big jump 
in entrepreneurial activity occurs between 
Groups 1 and 2. In contrast with the WEF 
scheme, there is also a relatively large increase 
in entrepreneurship between Groups 3 and 4. 
If we assume some delay between surges 
in entrepreneurship and improvements in 
governance, these different patterns of 
entrepreneurial expansion are roughly in line 
with the observed contrasts in governance 
between the two classifications.
In the case of the WEF countries, the pattern is 
fairly straightforward: the big gains in governance 
observed in Groups 3 and 4 follow the maximum 
rate of growth in entrepreneurship that occurs 
between Groups 2 and 3. Because of the big  
drop-off in entrepreneurial expansion when 
countries reach Groups 3 and 4, entrepreneurship 
ceases to play a significant role in governance 
change in Group 4 and 5 countries. 
The same general lagged pattern occurs for the 
discriminant country groupings, albeit not quite 
as sharply. For these countries, the largest rate 
of increase in entrepreneurship occurs between 
Groups 1 and 2. These increases are followed by 
improved governance in Groups 2 and 3, especially 
in voice and accountability, where entrepreneurship 
and the group dummy accounted for more than 60 
percent of the observed variance across countries. 
While there is a slight drop-off in the rate of 
growth of entrepreneurial activity from Group 2 
to 3 and Group 3 to 4, it is not nearly as dramatic 
as the decline from Group 3 to Group 4 in the 
WEF scheme. As a result, entrepreneurship 
continues to play a significant role in improving 
governance for countries in Groups 3 and 4. With 
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a 15 percent higher increase in entrepreneurship 
between Groups 3 and 4 than that observed with 
the WEF countries, entrepreneurship continues 
to play a significant role in the upgrading of 
governance for countries reaching Groups 4 and 5. 
From these results, one can tentatively  
conclude that successful movement through 
higher stages of development has been associated 
with entrepreneurial gains resulting in subsequent 
improvements in governance, as seen in the virtuous 
circle pattern of successful reform-led growth.
Entrepreneurship, Governance, and  
the Shadow Economy
One of the main impediments to competitiveness 
and sustained growth is the development of a 
large shadow, or informal, economy. Numerous 
studies have documented that, while the shadow 
economy may provide a temporary haven for the 
unemployed, its low level of productivity and tax 
potential ultimately causes a drag on sustained 
rates of economic growth.81 Furthermore, the 
Governance Measures Standardized t Sig R Square
 Coefficient   Adjusted
Discriminant Country Groups 4 and 5
Voice and Accountability
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.497 3.531 0.001 0.227
Political Stability
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.346 2.273 0.029 0.097
Government Effectiveness
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.770 8.628 0.000 -
  Entrepreneurship 0.256 2.872 0.007 0.695
Regulatory Quality
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.613 5.364 0.000 -  
  Entrepreneurship 0.312 2.733 0.010 0.499
Rule of Law
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.752 7.795 0.000 -
  Entrepreneurship 0.224 2.319 0.026 0.643
Control of Corruption
  Discriminant Stage Group Dummy 0.722 7.069 0.000 -
 Entrepreneurship 0.233 2.282 0.028 0.600
Notes: Stepwise Regression—Dependent Variables listed in order of entry. Data: Governance measures World Bank Governance Indicators; 
Entrepreneurship: World Bank, Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES), 2020. All data is for 2009.
Table 20. Entrepreneurship and Improved Governance: Discriminant Analysis Country Groupings cont’d.
 Entrepreneurship
 Discriminant WEF
Country Country Country 
Grouping Grouping Grouping
Group 1 0.404 0.472
Group 2 0.993 0.990
(% difference) 59.32 52.32
Group 3 2.036 2.374
(% difference) 51.23 58.30
Group 4 3.736 3.417
(% difference) 45.50 30.52
Group 5 6.267 5.948
(% difference) 40.39 42.55
Notes: World Bank: The 2020 World Bank Entrepreneurship 
Snapshots (WBGES). World Bank Entrepreneurship Dataset: 
Number of newly registered limited liability firms per 1,000 
working-age population (those of ages 15–64) for the year 2009.
Table 21. Entrepreneurship Activity  
by Country Grouping
81. See for example, Looney, “The Economic Consequences of Conflict: The Rise of Iraq’s Informal Economy,” Journal of Economic Issues 
(December 2006); and Looney, “Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” Revista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commercialli (December 2005).
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development of a large shadow economy is 
usually one of the symptoms of the vicious circle 
noted above. Often with the development of a 
large shadow economy, insurgent and criminal 
groups are able to establish secure sources of 
financing for their operations, further contributing 
to ongoing instability and economic decline.82
As might be expected, the size of the shadow 
economy declines as countries pass through the 
various stages of development, although this 
reduction appears to stall at around 35 percent of 
GDP at the Group 3 level before declining rapidly 
to 15.25 percent as countries reach Group 4. While 
the shadow economy contracts as entrepreneurial 
activity increases, it does so at a differential 
rate. Recent estimates place Pakistan’s shadow 
economy at about 37 percent of the country’s 
GDP,83 which is somewhat lower than the 40.45 
percent mean for Group 1 countries (Table 22). 
To test whether the reduction in the 
shadow economy is a direct result of increased 
entrepreneurship or the result of a more indirect 
process stemming from the improved governance 
associated with increased entrepreneurial activity, 
regressions were undertaken, beginning with 
Group 1 and gradually expanding the group 
sample size. For these countries (Table 23), 
improved goods market efficiency was the 
strongest factor reducing the size of the shadow 
economy, followed by innovation (a key element 
affecting the expansion of entrepreneurship for 
this group of countries) and fiscal freedom. The last 
term is logical since higher tax rates at early stages 
of development have been known to force many 
firms into informal (tax-avoidance) activities. These 
three variables account for more than 80 percent of 
the variance in the size of the shadow economies 
across this group of countries. Beyond these 
variables, entrepreneurship was not statistically 
significant in contributing to the regression 
equation. The model predicted the size of 
Pakistan’s shadow economy to be 37.5 percent—
quite close to its actual value of 37.1 percent.
Expanding the sample to include Group 2 
countries produced a shift in factors affecting the 
size of the shadow economy. Now, innovation 
becomes the most important variable, followed 
by investment freedom. Regulatory quality is 
a marginally significant variable in increasing 
the size of the shadow economy. Improved 
regulatory quality at this stage of development 
may force firms that are unable to comply into the 
shadow economy. Finally, expanding the sample 
to include Group 4 and 5 countries (Table 24) 
resulted in the rule of law playing the dominant 
role in the shadow economy’s reduction.
The results for the shadow economy are roughly 
consistent with the entrepreneur-led virtuous 
circle described above and, in that sense, close the 
circle. For Group 1 countries, economic reforms, 
especially in the areas of trade and improved 
 WEF Country Grouping
  
Country Shadow Entrepre- 
Grouping Economy neurship
Group 1 40.56 0.472
Group 2 35.54 0.990
(% difference) -14.12 52.32
Group 3 35.10 2.374
(% difference) -1.25 58.30
Group 4 27.86 3.417
(% difference) -25.99 30.52
Group 5 15.25 5.948
(% difference) -82.69 42.55
Notes: Entrepreneurship: The 2020 World Bank Entrepreneurship 
Snapshots (WBGES) Dataset—newly registered limited liability 
firms per 1,000 working age population. Shadow Economy  
(% GDP) from Andreas Buehn and Friedrich Schneider, “Shadow 
Economies and Corruption All Over the World: Revised Estimates 
for 120 Countries,” Economics: The Open-Access, Open-
Assessment E-Journal (October 27, 2009).
Table 22. Shadow Economy  
and Entrepreneurship
82. Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: The Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” The National Interest (Fall 2005).
83. This figure and those for our sample of countries are taken from Schneider and Buehn, “Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the 
World.”
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business freedom, jump-start entrepreneurial 
activity (Table 12). As entrepreneurial activity 
takes hold, this class begins to generate more 
resources for growth and supportive government 
services. With growth, political stability becomes 
easier to maintain (Table 15). For successful 
countries that are able to continue moving up the 
development scale, further growth and expansion 
in entrepreneurial activities result in the broad 
improvements in governance required for sustained 
growth. These patterns occur in WEF Groups 3 
and 4, with subsequent dramatic declines in the 
size of the shadow economy in Groups 4 and 5.
Implications of the 
Model for Pakistan’s New 
Growth Framework and 
Expeditionary Economics
Expeditionary Economics was originally formulated 
to assist countries emerging from protracted 
conflicts. For these countries, the normal policy 
set of foreign aid combined with a strategy of 
 Standardized t Sig df R R Square Adjusted
 Coefficient      R Square
WEF Group 1
Model 1
WEF Goods Market Efficiency -0.816 -5.099 0.000 13 0.816 0.667 0.641
Model 2
WEF Goods Market Efficiency -0.553 -3.637 0.003 - - - -
WEF Innovation -0.464 -3.054 0.010 12 0.901 0.812 0.781
Model 3
WEF Goods Market Efficiency -0.547 -4.151 0.002 - - - -
WEF Innovation -0.673 -4.155 0.002 - - - -
EF Fiscal Freedom -0.317 -2.222 0.048 11 0.933 0.871 0.835
Pakistan Actual=37.1% Predicted=37.5%
WEF Groups 1 and 2
Model 1
WEF Innovation -0.638 -3.970 0.001 23 0.638 0.407 0.381
Model 2
WEF Innovation -0.679 -4.494 0.000 - - - -
EF Monetary Freedom -0.318 -2.105 0.047 22 0.711 0.506 0.461
Pakistan Actual=37.1% Predicted=39.6%
WEF Groups 1, 2 and 3
Model 1
WEF Innovation -0.449 -2.255 0.002 42 0.449 0.201 0.182
Model 2
WEF Innovation -0.521 -3.802 0.000 - - - -
EF Innvestment Freedom -0.287 -2.099 0.042 41 0.528 0.279 0.244
Model 3
WEF Innovation -0.671 -4.478 0.000 - - - -
WEF Investment Freedom -0.623 -3.009 0.005 - - - -
WB Regulatory Quality 0.426 2.099 0.042 40 0.592 0.350 0.302
Pakistan Actual=37.1% Predicted=42.7%
Notes: Stepwise Regression Model: IBM SPSS 19.0; Country groupings are those formed from a discriminant analysis of the combined dataset. 
Dataset: WEF = World Economic Forum Competitiveness Dataset; EF = Heritage Economic Freedom Dataset; WB = World Bank Governance 
Indicators dataset. Entrepreneurship Data: World Bank Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES) 2010. Regression Analysis was the size of the shadow 
economy (% GDP) on the combined WEF, WB and EF datasets. Additional Variable: WEFGROUP, WEF Grouping from the WEF’s 2010–2011 
Competitiveness Report.
Table 23. Determinants of the Shadow Economy (Stepwise Regression)
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stabilization often resulted in stagnant growth 
and, in many cases, a relapse back to a state 
of conflict and instability. By emphasizing the 
role of entrepreneurship immediately after 
the cessation of conflict, the hope was that 
Expeditionary Economics could initiate a period 
of rapid recovery and sustained growth. 
The results of the empirical analysis detailed in 
the previous section suggest that the principles 
of Expeditionary Economics could be adapted 
to an even wider range of country situations; 
in particular, to countries like Pakistan where 
stalled development, internal strife, and escalating 
instability threaten democratic institutions and 
even state survival. The study findings show that 
an entrepreneurship-led development approach, 
also a key element in Pakistan’s New Growth 
Framework, has a solid theoretical and empirical 
foundation. Countries that have successfully 
progressed up the development ladder have 
drawn heavily on entrepreneurial activity, growth, 
and reform in creating their virtuous circles. 
Entrepreneurial-focused development has the 
potential to reverse the vicious circles of declining 
formal economic activity, a growing shadow 
economy, and increasing violence by creating 
a new group of stakeholders with a vested 
interest in stability, development, and reform. 
Of course, theoretical soundness and empirical 
viability are not necessary and sufficient conditions 
for successful implementation of any innovative 
strategy or policy. As Burki points out, advocates 
of the New Growth Framework have not come 
up with a plan of implementation.84 In addition, 
there may not be enough political space to 
accommodate such a dramatic shift in economic 
policy, since powerful groups have a strong vested 
interested in maintaining the status quo. In the 
past, these groups have blocked effective economic 
 Standardized t Sig df R R Square Adjusted
 Coefficient      R Square
WEF Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4
Model 1
WB Rule of Law 0.517 -4.315 0.000 51 0.517 0.267 0.253
Model 2
WB Rule of Law -0.505 -4.363 0.000 - - - -
WEF Market Size -0.254 -2.195 0.333 50 0.576 0.332 0.305
Pakistan Actual=37.1% Predicted=42.0%
WEF Groups 2, 3 and 4
Model 1
WB Rule of Law 0.503 -3.429 0.001 36 0.503 0.253 0.232
WEF Groups 3, 4 and 5
Model 1
WB Rule of Law -0.804 -9.835 0.000 53 0.804 0.646 0.639
Model 2
WB Rule of Law -0.793 -10.041 - - - - -
WEF Market Size -0.176 -2.231 - 54 0.823 0.677 0.665
Notes: Stepwise Regression Model: IBM SPSS 19.0; Country groupings are those formed from a discriminant analysis of the combined dataset. 
Dataset: WEF = World Economic Forum Competitiveness Dataset; EF = Heritage Economic Freedom Dataset; WB = World Bank Governance 
Indicators dataset. Entrepreneurship Data: World Bank Enterprise Snapshots (WBGES) 2010. Regression Analysis was the size of the shadow 
economy (% GDP) on the combined WEF, WB and EF datasets. Additional Variable: WEFGROUP, WEF Grouping from the WEF’s 2010–2011 
Competitiveness Report.
Table 24. Determinants of the Shadow Economy cont’d. (Stepwise Regression)
84. Burki, “Credible Growth Strategy or a Wish List?” Dawn, May 2, 2011.
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and governance reforms, trapping the country 
in a pattern of failed takeoffs and stagnation. 
For countries like Pakistan where conflict 
has not swept away the old order with its 
entrenched interests, Expeditionary Economics 
may play an important role over time. A rising 
new progressive entrepreneurial class with a 
major stake in ongoing reforms is precisely what 
is needed to offset the influence of entrenched 
interests opposed to change. This new class of 
entrepreneurs is the best hope for overcoming 
existing impediments to reform and creating a 
sound foundation for sustained future growth.
The Failure of Foreign Aid
Despite decades of foreign aid, the World 
Economic Forum classifies Pakistan’s development 
level as Stage 1, the lowest rung of the 
development ladder.85 Foreign aid to Pakistan 
has neither resulted in the kind of prosperity and 
stability that offer a clear alternative to extremism 
nor bought much goodwill for the United States.86 
In fact, the outcomes of massive infusions of aid 
have been so unsatisfactory that both donor and 
recipient groups agree that in many respects the 
country would have been better off without it.87 
Even aid advocates such as Nancy Birdsall and 
Molly Kinder concede that, “Despite millions 
of dollars of outside aid to support antipoverty 
programs, poverty was higher in Pakistan in 2004 
than it was a decade earlier when the program 
began.”88 From the Pakistani perspective, there is 
growing dissatisfaction with ongoing aid programs, 
especially those provided by the United States. 
Pakistani politicians like Mian Shahbaz Sharif 
complain that existing U.S. aid programs are an 
affront to national honor and that the country 
should only accept further inflows if conditionalities 
such as efforts to control corruption are removed.89 
Unfortunately, the problem with this line of 
thinking is that, even with such conditionalities,  
the top-down nature of traditional foreign aid 
programs by definition fosters corruption. Foreign 
aid in Pakistan has created an entrenched elite with 
a vested interest in blocking reforms that threaten 
their rent-seeking activities. In this way, it has 
lessened the need for the government to forge a 
bond with its citizens by raising revenue and 
redistributing those funds as services, thus 
weakening the social contract and removing 
incentives for the country’s evolution into a 
functional democracy capable of providing for  
its people.90
Even when aid manages to trickle down, the 
amount that actually makes it to the grassroots 
level is too small to make much of a difference.91 
According to one recent estimate,92 if the United 
States were to withdraw all civilian economic 
assistance, its impact on Pakistan’s GDP growth 
rate would be only 0.14 percent.93 Perhaps just  
as importantly, the aid holds little value for 
communities that receive it, since they have scant 
input in designing or requesting programs to 
address their pressing needs.94
Entrepreneurial Development and 
the New Growth Framework
An extensive quantitative analysis of the 
growth patterns of successful countries suggests 
that entrepreneurship-led development, which 
forms the foundation for both Pakistan’s New 
85. World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2010−2011 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2010), 11.
86. Witte, “U.S. Aid Buys Little Goodwill.”
87. Birdsall and Kinder, The U.S. Aid “Surge” to Pakistan: Repeating a Failed Experiment? and Burki, “Living Without Foreign Assistance.”
88. Birdsall and Kinder.
89. Mian Shahbaz Sharif, quoted in Burki, “Living Without Foreign Assistance.”
90. Fair, “A Better Bargain for Aid to Pakistan,” The Washington Post, May 30, 2009.
91. Aftab, The Enigma of U.S. Aid,” The Friday Times, April 22, 2011.
92. Arnoldy and Ahmed, “U.S. Cuts Aid to Pakistan: Six Key Questions.”
93. Ibid.
94. Aftab, “The Enigma of U.S. Aid.”95. World Bank, Doing Business in Pakistan 2010 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 2010), xv.
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Growth Framework and Expeditionary Economics, 
is a promising alternative. The analysis found that 
entrepreneurial activity was a key element driving 
the growth process through progressive stages of 
economic development. Successful countries that 
followed an entrepreneurship-led strategy, such 
as the Czech Republic and Poland, sustained their 
growth through a series of ongoing economic 
and governance reforms initiated by this growing 
stakeholder group. The result was the creation 
of a virtuous circle in which increased economic 
liberalization led to expanded entrepreneurship, 
increased growth, and improved governance, 
which in turn led to further growth and 
development (see Fig. 15). 
 
According to the World Bank’s Business in 
Pakistan report: 
There is no blueprint for how to grow and 
prosper in a challenging environment, but 
one factor is creating an investment climate 
conducive to starting and running a business, 
where complying with regulations brings 
more benefits than costs, and where an 
entrepreneur with an innovative idea can 
test the waters and succeed or fail. Where 
commercial regulations are simple, efficient 
and accessible to all, entrepreneurs can 
focus on what they do best—running their 
businesses. This is important for Pakistan 
where small and medium size firms constitute 
nearly 90% of all enterprises, employ 
80% of the nonagricultural labor force 
and contribute 40% of annual GDP.95
The empirical results support this argument. 
For Pakistan and other Group 1 countries, 
trade liberalization and increased business 
freedom have the most stimulative effects 
on entrepreneurship and new firm creation, 
out of a wide range of governance, economic 
freedom, and competitiveness factors. 
Local communities have some degree of 
control over the rules and regulations governing 
business, as illustrated by the wide range of 
differences in the ease of doing business among 
Pakistan’s major cities (Table 25). However, while 
business freedom can be addressed at the local 
level, trade liberalization lies firmly in the hands 
of Pakistan’s central government. According 
to the Heritage Foundation, Pakistan’s level of 
trade freedom is below the norm for Group 1 
countries, with import restrictions, inconsistent and 
burdensome regulations, and corruption adding 
considerably to the cost of trade.96  Proponents of 
the New Growth Framework will need to amass 
sufficient support and momentum to overcome 
95. World Bank, Doing Business in Pakistan 2010 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 2010), xv.
96. Heritage Foundation, The 2011 Index of Economic Freedom. 
Reforms and
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Source: Oleh Havrylyshyn and Thomas Wolf, “Determinants 
of Growth in Transition Countries,” Finance & Development 
(June 1999). 
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Fig. 15. Successful Reforms and Virtuous Circles
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the many entrenched groups who currently 
benefit from these added costs and restrictions.
Assuming these reforms can be put in place, 
the discriminant analysis identified innovation 
and infrastructure as the most important 
factors facilitating a country’s rise from Group 
1 to Group 2. Pakistan scored above even 
the Group 2 countries on innovation, which 
indicates that it has the makings of a large and 
dynamic entrepreneurial class. The country 
lags significantly, however, in infrastructure. 
In the usual development sequence, the 
government would take the lead in addressing 
this deficiency in order to reduce the costs of 
entrepreneurial activities so their profitability 
becomes readily apparent. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s 
government is notoriously bad at this type of 
decision-making and innovation. One advantage 
of the discriminant analysis approach is that it 
suggests ways that countries can make up for 
these types of deficiencies by overcompensating 
in other areas, in a process akin to the unbalanced 
growth strategy originally developed by Albert 
Hirschman.97 In Pakistan’s case, the analysis 
suggests that the entrepreneurial class could 
assume the lead role in a Hirschman-type process. 
Under this scenario, the New Growth 
Framework and Expeditionary Economics would 
encourage entrepreneurs to continue and expand 
their innovative activity. The entrepreneurs, in turn, 
would place increased pressure on the government 
to provide accommodating infrastructure. As the 
entrepreneurial class grew in strength, its influence 
would help spur a productive public investment 
program to meet specific needs and overcome 
well-identified bottlenecks to increased economic 
activity. Such a public investment program 
would extend not only to physical but to human 
capital, as the increasing sophistication of firms 
combines with trade-induced technology transfer 
to expand the demand for skilled workers.
Once growth has been jump-started, 
entrepreneurial reform efforts must immediately 
shift to governance reforms, particularly in the 
areas of voice and accountability, to create a 
virtuous circle that will allow the country to sustain 
97. Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1958). 
   Dealing with   Trading
 Ease of Doing Starting a Construction Registering Paying Across Enforcing
 Business Business Permits Property Taxes Borders Contracts
City, Province (rank) (rank) (rank) (rank) (rank) (rank) (rank)
Falsalabad, Punjab 1 2 6 1 3 4 2
Multan, Punjab 2 6 1 7 3 5 4
Lehore, Punjab 3 3 3 4 3 13 8
Islamabad, ICT 4 1 8 3 1 11 10
Shelkhupura, Punjab 5 9 8 5 3 7 6
Gujranwala, Punjab 6 13 2 6 3 10 4
Sukkur, Sindh 7 10 4 10 11 3 1
Peshawaar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 8 3 6 9 10 8 8
Karachi, Sindh 9 3 10 11 11 1 3
Rawalpindi, Punjab 10 8 5 7 3 12 10
Slalkot, Punjab 11 12 11 1 3 5 10
Quetta, Baluchistan 12 6 12 13 2 9 13
Hyderbad, Sindh 13 11 13 11 11 2 7
Note: The ease of doing business as the ranking on the simple average percentile rankings on each of the six topics covered. The ranking 
on each topic is the simple average of the percentile rankings on its component indicators. Source: World Bank, Doing Business in Pakistan 
(2010), 7.
Table 25. Ease of Doing Business in Pakistan
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its growth and continue up the development ladder 
to Group 2, 3, and beyond, as illustrated in Fig. 16. 
Economic reforms by Musharraf in the early to 
mid-2000s were not followed by improvements in 
governance and instead gave rise to a new set of 
rent seekers who blocked further reforms, stalling 
the economic takeoff.98 Eastern European countries, 
like Belarus and Romania, that were unsuccessful 
in completing their transitions from communism 
followed a similar pattern and devolved into a 
vicious circle in which initial steps toward market 
reform create opportunities for rent seeking and 
corruption. Vested interests that benefit from 
these opportunities very soon establish themselves 
and resist further reform steps, such as allowing 
open entry to the market, fostering competition, 
providing for full liberalization, and establishing a 
solid rule of law. As a side effect, an underground 
economy emerges. Limited competition, incomplete 
liberalization, incentives to go underground, 
and the uneven rule of law can freeze the 
transformation in its tracks. Slow economic 
progress, a reversal of growth, and a collapse of 
financial stabilization can easily result (see Fig. 17).99
The Application of Expeditionary 
Economics to Pakistan
Pakistan’s negative experiences with aid, combined 
with donor fatigue and the country’s resource 
shortages, overwhelmingly support implementation 
of the entrepreneurial development principles of 
the New Growth Framework. To gain the political 
support and momentum to push through the trade 
reforms needed for national implementation, its 
proponents may want to focus in the short term on 
implementing the framework in disaster-stricken 
and/or unstable and unsafe areas of the country 
where entrepreneurial efforts targeted to local 
needs could show immediate economic benefits. 
In these situations, Expeditionary Economics could 
play an invaluable role, particularly in areas of 
the country that are currently out of the effective 
reach of the central government. An examination 
98. Looney, “Failed Take-Off,” 7.
99. Havrylyshyn and Wolf, “Determinants of Growth in Transition Countries.” Carlotta Gall, “Floods in Pakistan Carry the Seeds of Upheaval,” The 
New York Times, September 5, 2010.
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of Pakistan’s response to the 2010 floods and the 
Swat Valley insurgency demonstrates the potential 
benefits of an Expeditionary Economics approach.
In August/September 2010, floods affected  
one-fifth of Pakistan, an area roughly the size  
of England. The vast scope of the damage  
created a situation with long-term economic 
and political consequences, as government 
mismanagement of the disaster added to the 
distrust that many Pakistanis already felt for their 
civilian political leaders. 
In the aftermath, there were scores of angry 
accusations that government officials had guided 
relief only to their own party supporters. Lacking 
confidence in the government’s ability to deliver 
relief, the United States and international  
agencies turned instead to private groups to 
provide assistance.100
The Pakistani military stepped into the 
breach, greatly improving its public perception. 
The military was able to reach and rescue 
more than 100,000 flood-stranded people 
and coordinate sustained relief efforts in the 
months following the flooding.101 Unfortunately, 
the military’s efforts appear to have stopped 
there. Those affected by the floods were forced 
to rely for long-term recovery on NGOs and 
their own creativity: selling animals, building 
new mud huts, and planting more rice.102 
The Pakistani military’s actions in the Swat 
Valley, albeit a much more violent setting, 
won even fewer hearts and minds. In May 
2009, the Pakistani army began a sustained 
campaign against the pro-Taliban militants then 
in control of the Swat region.103 This campaign 
had widespread public support, despite the fact 
that the army’s previous clearing operations 
in the area failed to hold ground, opening 
the population to militant reprisals.104 
By July 2010, the military’s scorched earth 
policies had largely restored law and order, 
and most of the valley’s displaced persons had 
returned to their homes. While the army has 
proven its staying power and rightfully takes 
credit for stabilizing Swat, stability came at a 
high price for the residents, many of whom now 
perceive the army as an occupation force that 
has done little to guarantee their livelihoods 
or improve their standards of living.105 
The Swat Valley’s story is not unique. Pakistan’s 
federal and provincial bureaucracies have also 
Reforms and
economic progress
 Vicious circle
Source: Oleh Havrylyshyn and Thomas Wolf, “Determinants 
of Growth in Transition Countries,” Finance & Development 
(June 1999). 
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Fig. 17. Failed Reforms and Vicious Circles
100. Carlotta Gall, “Floods in Pakistan Carry the Seeds of Upheaval,” The New York Times, September 5, 2010.
101. Ibid.
102. Burki, “A Weakened State,” Dawn, September 14, 2010.
103. Economic control had been in effect since late 2008. See Aftab, “Taliban Control of Swat’s Economy,” The Friday Times, April 10, 2009.
104. This account of military action in the Swat Valley draws heavily on C. Christine Fair, “Pakistan in 2010: Flooding, Governmental Inefficiency, 
and Continued Insurgency,” Asian Survey 51 (2011): 103−104.
105. Rebecca Conway, “Slow Government Development Threatens Swat Military,” Reuters, April 15, 2011.
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failed to provide systematic development and 
other aid to conflict-affected areas, offer adequate 
assistance to internally displaced persons, or 
engage in other efforts to create a relationship of 
mutual support with the locals. In addition to Swat, 
the government’s inability to provide immediate 
relief has exacerbated the army’s reliance on 
scorched-earth policies and alienated the local 
population in places like South Waziristan and 
Bajaur.106 Unless efforts are quickly undertaken 
to improve economic activity and provide jobs, 
regions like these will be locked in a vicious circle 
of low investment and increasing poverty that is 
likely to lead to further instability and violence.
Training the Pakistani military and/or local police 
forces to implement Expeditionary Economics could 
vastly improve local economic recovery following 
natural disasters or anti-insurgency campaigns. 
Funds distributed by these forces to the scores 
of entrepreneurs who otherwise would find 
themselves wiped out by a disaster could be put to 
immediate use restoring businesses and creating 
jobs in local cleanup and construction. In anti-
insurgency situations, forces could assist not only 
by identifying new entrepreneurs and channeling 
funding, but by providing security so they could 
begin or resume business without fear of violence. 
In both situations, the boost to the local economy 
would bolster the social compact by demonstrating 
the government’s ability to care for its people.
While the application of Expeditionary 
Economics to Pakistan appears promising, there 
are some major questions that must be resolved 
before its success can be assured. In particular:
–  Should the responsibility for implementing 
Expeditionary Economics be given to the military 
or the local police? Which will likely be better 
received by local communities and garner the 
support of local leaders?
–  Currently, the Pakistani military has vast holdings 
of land and controls numerous industries.107 If the 
military is to implement Expeditionary Economics, 
how can its vested interests be controlled?
–  Whether the funds are channeled through the 
military or police, what checks and balances will 
be necessary to prevent corruption? Performance 
grants that must pass annual audits to gain 
renewal are one option.
–  Given the strong family, tribal, and political 
ties that exist in Pakistan, how can objectivity 
be assured in the selection of viable new 
entrepreneurs? Annual audits that look at 
company profits and the number of jobs 
produced hold promise, but might additional 
criteria be required?
–  What types of training are best for assuring 
successful implementation of Expeditionary 
Economics within Pakistan? Would it be best to 
train existing officers or establish a new special 
corps with elite business training? Would existing 
programs in the country’s universities and 
research institutes provide sufficient instruction, 
or would study abroad be required?
Policy Implications
Expeditionary Economics does not exist in a 
vacuum. In Pakistan’s case, there are a number 
of supporting policies both the United States/
European Union and Pakistani government can 
undertake to strengthen the forces set in motion 
by increased entrepreneurial activity at the local/
community level. In this regard, the empirical 
results summarized in previous sections provide a 
number of insights for policy design. Focus here is 
on overcoming the immediate binding constraints 
in those areas critical for initiating a renewed 
process of growth and entrepreneurial expansion:
–  From the discriminant analysis, the immediate 
constraints on Pakistan’s movement to a higher 
106. Seth Jones and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2010).
107. Documented in Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2007).
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level of development are infrastructure and 
innovation.
–  From the regression analysis, improved freedom 
in trade and business freedom are the reforms 
most effective at encouraging increased 
entrepreneurship.
–  Also from the regression analysis, innovation 
is a key factor in reducing the size of the 
shadow economy, thus facilitating increased 
productivity and tax collection. With increased 
entrepreneurship, innovation proceeds to 
complete the virtuous circle of growth and 
development.
Trade Policy
In Pakistan’s case, increasing trade freedom 
suggests that reducing Pakistan’s trade barriers 
would facilitate an expansion of exports and 
imports, thus increasing domestic efficiency 
and generating opportunities for new export-
based businesses. Pakistan’s granting108 of 
MFN (most favored nation) status to India is a 
major step in this regard, with significant gains 
for the country obtained through reducing 
the transaction costs of doing business 
between the two countries. One estimate by 
The Associated Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry of India suggests that there is potential 
to raise the present level of bilateral trade 
and investment to as much as $10 billion with 
minimal additional efforts by both countries.109
For U.S. policymakers, a recent study110 
undertaken by the Center for Global Development 
puts forth the recommendation to let Pakistani 
products compete in U.S. markets: “As part of 
an overall plan to spur private investment and 
job creation in Pakistan, we urge Congress and 
the administration to work together to extend 
duty-free, quota-free access to U.S. markets for 
all Pakistani exports from all of Pakistan for at 
least the next five years.”111 This recommendation 
is not new and has been put forth a number of 
times.112 It is similar to that recently advanced by 
the British charity Trade Out of Poverty. A key 
assumption also made by this group is that aid and 
debt relief can alleviate poverty, but only trade 
can enable countries to leave poverty behind.113 
There is, no doubt, some truth in the superiority 
of trade over aid in generating sustained 
growth with permanent increases in productive 
employment. Unfortunately, trade-based 
initiatives of this type are overly simplistic and, 
in Pakistan’s case, likely fraught with a number 
of difficulties. For starters, given the political 
climate in Washington, initiatives of this sort 
simply will not happen in the foreseeable future.
In addition, past instances of similar trade-
assistance approaches provide a very mixed 
picture.114 The use of trade incentives is a long-
standing U.S. policy. Especially during the Cold 
War, trade and access to the U.S. market were 
used to strengthen allies such as Taiwan, South 
Korea, Israel, and on a smaller scale, a host of other 
friendly governments. Implicit in this strategy was 
the belief that improved trade and incomes would 
set in motion a virtuous circle of further economic 
and governance reforms as countries sought to 
improve efficiency and competitiveness. In turn, 
108. Vivek Katju, “MFN Status to India: Move by Pakistan is Based on Logic,” India Today, November 4, 2011.
109. Aftab Ahmad Chaudhry, “A Multi-Dimensional Benefit,” The News, November 8, 1011.
110. Nancy Birdsall et al., Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Fixing the U.S. Approach to Development in Pakistan: Report of the Study Group on a U.S. 
Development Strategy in Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, June 2011).
111. Birdsall, et al., Beyond Bullets and Bombs, 2.
112. Summarized in Looney, “Problems in Using International Trade to Counter Terrorism: The Case of Pakistan,” Journal of South Asian and 
Middle Eastern Studies (Summer 2003).
113. Peter Lilley, et al., “Trade Out of Poverty,” World Economics (April−June 2011).
114. The following summarizes the main findings on trade access, economic reform, and growth presented in Looney, “U.S. Middle East Economic 
Policy: The Use of Free Trade Areas in the War on Terrorism,” Mediterranean Quarterly (Summer 2005). For the Pakistani case, see Looney, 
“Problems in Using International Trade to Counter Terrorism.”
49
E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p  a n d  t h e  P r o c e s s  o f  D e v e l o p m e n t : 
A  F r a m e w o r k  f o r  A p p l i e d  E x p e d i t i o n a r y  E c o n o m i c s  i n  P a k i s t a n
T r a d e  P o l i c y
improved economic efficiency and governance 
further expanded the economies’ gains from trade.
What happened in practice? Virtuous circles or 
something closely resembling them were attained 
in countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Costa Rica, where the preexisting social and 
political conditions were more or less conducive to 
development and—at least eventually—democracy. 
On the other hand, only very limited successes 
were achieved in countries such as Haiti, Honduras, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines. These were 
countries where the preexisting conditions were 
less amenable to economic and political liberalism. 
Pete Moore and Andrew Schrank go as far as to 
conclude the following:115 
In fact, the lessons of history are clear. Trade 
alone will tend to underpin—rather than to 
undermine—preexisting social and political 
arrangements … If trade and aid are offered 
conditionally (i.e., as a quid pro quo for political 
or foreign policy reform), they risk igniting a 
nationalist, anti-American, and quite possibly 
Islamist backlash—particularly if the conditions 
are perceived to benefit the United States or 
Israel rather than Arab firms, investors, and 
citizens. If they are offered unconditionally, 
however, they threaten to do little more than 
enrich already powerful and self-serving elites 
and to thereby undermine the prospects for 
peace and prosperity in the Middle East.
Trade access to the United States or European 
markets appears to set off a virtuous circle of 
growth and reform only in those countries that 
have already achieved a relatively high level of 
economic freedom and governance. The less 
successful countries’ difficulties stem from the 
fact that there seem to be only limited linkages 
between freer trade and the major dimensions 
of governance.116 Pakistan falls in this category.
If Pakistan had been a country with years of 
good governance, experiencing strong, stable 
investment patterns while undergoing increased 
globalization and possessing a highly literate 
workforce, open trade with the United States 
might have opened up numerous opportunities 
for the country. The reality is that Pakistan has 
experienced poor export growth and low-export 
competitiveness for decades. As Chaudhry117 notes, 
the country’s traditional export model involves 
sending a small group of low-tech and low-value 
products—notably textiles and clothing—to an 
equally small set of destinations such as the United 
States and Europe. As noted above, innovation and 
increased trade freedom will be critical first steps in 
advancing the country’s growth. This kind of trade 
pattern is not ideal any more in a world which is 
being shaped by innovative products and services: 
Therefore, Pakistan could also broaden and 
integrate its economy by focusing more on 
trades in several sectors such as information 
technology, financial, health and entertainment 
services, energy, telecom and tourism sectors. 
The improvement in bilateral trade with 
India, whose economy has undergone a 
sustained period of diversification, would also 
enable Pakistan to focus on a modern export 
development strategy. Increased completion 
with the regional markets is expected to focus 
the country on the need to increase both the 
volume and value of exports through product 
diversification and value enhancements.118 
In sum, United States and European efforts 
should be focused on encouraging and 
facilitating more trade for Pakistan on a regional 
level. World Bank studies119 suggest that trade 
based on geographic proximity offers more 
115. Pete W. Moore and Andrew Schrank, “Commerce and Conflict: U.S. Effort to Counter Terrorism with Trade May Backfire,” Middle East Policy 
(2003).
116. Looney, “U.S. Middle East Economic Policy,” 111−112.
117. Chaudhry, “A Multi-Dimensional Benefit,” The News, November 7, 2011.
118. Ibid.
119. Summarized in Uwe Deichmann and Indermit Gill, “The Economic Geography of Regional Integration,” Finance & Development (December 
2008).
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opportunities for countries at Pakistan’s level 
of development and industrial sophistication 
than trade with distant developed countries. 
Small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
comprise 85 percent of entrepreneurial businesses 
in Pakistan. They employ approximately 78 percent 
of the non-agricultural labor force and contribute 
more than 30 percent to Pakistan’s GDP and 25 
percent of the country’s exports of manufactured 
goods.120 Trade at the regional level would enable 
the country, through new entrepreneurial activity, 
to find niches in the supply chain, supplying 
countries like China with critical parts and supplies.
The United States/European Union can play 
an extremely important role through aid for 
trade programs (AFT) in assisting Pakistan in its 
integration into export markets. Aid for trade 
is development assistance targeted at building 
up the country’s capabilities, knowledge, 
and infrastructure in order to empower 
and enable new entrepreneurs and start-
up firms’ integration into export markets.
Development assistance in the form of 
AFT rests on the idea that overcoming these 
constraints necessitates additional costs and 
greater investment, which Pakistan cannot provide 
on its own. The rationale is based on the fact 
that removal of tariff and nontariff barriers is a 
necessary yet insufficient tool for market access.120 
In addition, AFT can assist in overcoming 
many of the risks to trade liberalization noted 
above. Specifically, AFT can be used by the 
United States/European Union as an instrument 
to advance Pakistani trade liberalization in 
exchange for aid. This assistance could be aimed 
not just at assisting new firms, but also toward 
sectors likely to face losses from liberalization 
and subsequent restructuring costs.121
Infrastructure Policy
The empirical results noted above, together with 
limitations on stimulating the Pakistan economy 
through increased trade linkages, suggest that 
direct U.S. involvement in enabling the country to 
overcome its infrastructure constraints is the most 
productive course of action at the present time. 
Several areas of infrastructure appear especially 
promising in relieving growth/entrepreneurial 
constraints.
According to the Legatum Institute’s Prosperity 
Index for 2011,123 a broad assessment of country 
development and growth prospects, Pakistan 
places close to the global average for its level of 
R&D expenditure, indicating a potentially favorable 
environment for entrepreneurship. However, 
according to the index, the country only earned 
a disappointing $6 million from royalty receipts 
in 2009, and ICT exports account for just 0.3 
percent of total goods exports. This pattern can 
be traced to another constraint facing Pakistan: 
the country’s communications infrastructure is 
weak—only around 60 percent of the population 
own a mobile phone, Internet bandwidth 
capacity is equally poor, and there are very few 
secure Internet servers, all of which suggests 
a weak infrastructure for entrepreneurship. 
The United States could help here by providing 
or subsidizing political risk insurance for U.S./
Pakistani firms contributing directly or indirectly 
to the country’s communications infrastructure.
In terms of direct assistance for infrastructure, 
the United States can play a significant role in 
regard to post-flood reconstruction, but perhaps 
even more importantly in the energy area. Since 
2006, Pakistan has been facing an energy crisis,124 
which has worsened in the last four years: the 
domestic energy shortfall is estimated to be in the 
120. ul Haque, “Towards a New Development Approach,” The Friday Times, October 8, 2010.
121. Oxford Analytica, International: Aid for Trade Will Attract Companies, October 28, 2011.
122. Ibid.
123. http://www.prosperity.com/country.aspx?id=PK.
124. Looney, “Energy and the Pakistani Economy: An Exploratory Analysis to 2035,” in Powering Pakistan: Meeting Pakistan’s Energy Needs in the 
21st Century, ed. Robert M. Hathaway and Michael Kugelman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 39−50.
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range of four to six gigawatts; around 40 percent 
of households have no access to electricity; the 
vital textile export industry lost nearly $4 billion last 
year as irregular supplies forced factories to close 
down for 100 days; and government subsidies to 
the power sector, which cost 220 billion rupees 
($2.5 billion) per annum, drain resources from 
education and healthcare programs.125 
According to the government, overall energy 
supplies will need to be increased by at least 10 
percent a year until 2015 to sustain growth. In 
order to boost power generation in the long term, 
the authorities have turned to international support 
for the development of the hydroelectricity, mining, 
and nuclear energy sectors. China is playing a 
leading role in all these areas.
 Growing gas shortfalls have accelerated plans 
for an Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, from 
which India has withdrawn at the United States’ 
request:
–  Under the present bilateral Gas Sales Agreement, 
the 800 kilometer pipeline to Nawabshah (Sindh) 
would supply 750 million cubic feet of gas per 
day starting in 2014, which would be used to 
generate 4,500 megawatts of electricity. The 
government hopes the pipeline will eventually 
supply more than 1 billion cubic feet of gas per 
day at 78 percent crude oil parity price.
–  However, this project could be blocked if 
Pakistani companies that import Iranian gas are 
barred from accessing the U.S. financial system 
and U.S. market under the terms of sanctions 
against Iran.
Because of the critical role that energy will 
play in either advancing or constraining Pakistani 
growth, U.S. efforts would be most productive in 
matching China’s efforts at increasing domestic 
supplies, while removing its objections to gas deals 
with Iran. The ongoing opposition to Iranian gas is 
only fueling anti-American resentment in Pakistan.  
Business Freedom/Removing 
Constraints on Entrepreneurship
The final immediate constraint on growth 
and entrepreneurship in Pakistan centers on 
business freedom. While the United States and 
European countries cannot do much directly 
to change the country’s business climate, they 
can assist, as in the energy area, in removing 
some of the constraints to entrepreneurship.
Probably the simplest way open to the United 
States and European Union of increasing the 
number of entrepreneurs is to assist funding 
Pakistan-based NGO microcredit organizations. 
While controversial, there is growing acceptance 
of the role of microcredit in initiating growth 
and development and thus expanding the 
entrepreneurial class. As a recent survey of the 
literature concludes:126
Co-finance has steadily grown to provide 
credit to hundreds of thousands of individuals 
living in third world countries. The spreading 
of and innovation within the microfinance 
sector demonstrates a successful neoliberal 
initiative that is both socially conscious and 
economically beneficial. By connecting groups 
of poor individuals to lending institutions or 
affluent individuals in developed countries, 
microloans have been able to foster the 
strengthening of local economies, necessary 
for consuming life-improving technology, while 
incurring minimal risk to the lending party. 
Criticisms of microfinance—both non-profit 
and for-profit models—appear misguided 
as there are clear data demonstrating both 
a low incidence of default and modest 
interest rates. Moreover, credit has been the 
foundation for modern economic growth. 
Ethical lending to the Third World should 
125. Oxford Analytica, Pakistan: No End in Sight for Deepening Energy Crisis, January 25, 2011.
126. Gregor Campbell, “Microfinancing the Developing World: How Small Loans Empower Local Economies and Catalyse Neoliberalism’s 
Endgame,” Their World Quarterly (2010).
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therefore not be denied, but rather intensified 
through the faculty of microfinance.
Building up a large growing entrepreneurial 
class has broader benefits than simply setting the 
stage for more rapid growth in the short term. 
Over time, it lays the potential foundation for 
sustained growth and, with improved governance, 
the virtuous circle of expanded entrepreneurship, 
business activity, and reform. Hopefully, as in 
the case of many successful former communist 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 
expanding numbers of entrepreneurs will exert 
increased pressure on the government to enact 
more business-friendly laws and regulations. 
Assessment— 
Mancur Olson’s Coalitions
Whether expanding numbers of entrepreneurs will 
play this positive role depends on which of Mancur 
Olson’s127 coalitions dominate over time. Olson 
distinguished between distributional coalitions, 
which are seen as leading to outcomes inimical to 
economic growth, and encompassing coalitions, 
which are seen as potentially aiding economic 
growth in a society. For Olson, the equilibrium-
upsetting crisis of losing a war explained postwar 
growth in Japan and Germany. By making possible 
reforms that neutralized entrenched vested 
interests, the crisis produced a fresh environment 
in which the benefits of public institutions and 
policies could be distributed more widely.
The Olsonian framework enables a deeper 
insight to Pakistan’s stalled development. The 
literature on Pakistan is replete with laundry lists of 
what the country should do to turn the economy 
around: increase tax revenues, invest more in 
education, reduce defense expenditures, and on 
and on. There is nearly uniform consensus among 
economists as to what changes the country will 
have to undertake if it is to restore high rates of 
sustained growth. Clearly, if it were simply a matter 
of implementing sound policies, the country would 
have become a developed country long ago. 
The answer to the country’s lack of economic 
progress can, in large part, be traced to Olson’s 
distributional coalitions that currently are dominant 
in Pakistan, blocking reforms and stifling the 
development of encompassing coalitions. The 
country’s distributional coalitions consists of feudal 
landlords blocking land reform,128 military coalitions 
protecting their vast network of industries,129 as 
well as trade with India, and groups of favored 
industrialists (crony capitalists) that rose to 
power in the freewheeling Musharraf days.130
These distributional coalitions have created 
an extremely unstable environment that can be 
traced in large part to low government revenue 
caused by the various groups’ use of tax evasion, 
loopholes, and exemptions. Fewer than three 
million of Pakistan’s 175 million citizens pay any 
income taxes, and the country’s tax-to-GDP 
ratio is only 9 percent. Tax evasion means that 
fewer resources are available for essential social 
services. “Pakistan spends too much on defense 
and too little on development: It has spent twice 
as much on defense during peacetime as it has 
on education and health combined,” said S. 
Akbar Zaidi. “The government knows how to 
increase its revenue through tax reform, but the 
rich and powerful have resisted such measures 
for fear of lowering their own incomes.”131
Industrial policies during the Musharraf 
days offer insight into past mistakes that will 
need to be avoided in the future if Pakistan 
is to develop a dynamic entrepreneurial class. 
Specifically, under Musharraf the government 
gave an enormous amount of freedom to 
private entrepreneurs. The government played a 
minimal role, intervening only when the private 
127. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). 
See also Olson, “The South Will Fall Again: The South as Leader and Laggard in Economic Growth,” Southern Economic Journal (1983).
128. Mosharraf Zaidi, “Pakistan’s Rent-Seeking Missiles,” The News, March 2, 2011.
129. Cf. Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.
130. Burki, Changing Perceptions, Altered Reality.
131. S. Akbar Zaidi, “Pakistan’s Roller-Coaster Economy: Tax Evasion Stifles Growth,” Carnegie Policy Brief, September 2010.
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sector felt it was faced with unfair competition 
from abroad. This allowed private monopolies 
to develop at the expense of the consumer. 
Protected by the state, some sectors developed 
rapidly but not competitively. The automobile 
sector is an example which thrived behind the 
wall of protection that was built around it.132 
Overall, the manufacturing sector is narrowly 
based and stuck in products for which global 
market demand is either stagnant or shrinking. 
Entrepreneurial and innovative energies are 
misplaced and largely directed toward rent- 
seeking activities such as subsidies, protection,  
and tax evasion.133
Fortunately, there are some indications  
that Pakistan’s distributional coalitions are 
weakening, providing the opportunity for an 
expanding class of new entrepreneurs forming a 
broad-based encompassing coalition capable of 
turning the reform tide against the distributional 
coalitions. With democracy, in the last few years 
one sees some weakening of the military as 
evidenced by the granting of MFN (most favored 
nation) status to India. Freer trade may also 
weaken somewhat the entrenched position of  
the Musharraf-era industrialists.
As for the feudal landlords, the picture is 
mixed. Vast estates belonging to feudal families 
stretch out across the country, sometimes covering 
hundreds of acres. According to the World 
Bank, about 2 percent of households control 
more than 45 percent of the total land area. 
Large farmers also have monopolized subsidies 
in water and agriculture—with the system in 
place contributing heavily to rural poverty.134
In a feudal country where landlords have 
strong influence, landless farmers face great 
difficulty in recovering their livelihoods. Because 
landlords have so much power, farmers have 
been forced to pay high interest rates while 
receiving small returns from crops. This system 
places many into a constant cycle of debt. 
Many of the flood victims in refugee camps or 
those taking up new residence in the country’s 
urban areas are escaping the country’s brutal rural 
feudal system. For those remaining on the land, 
the floods have only compounded the problems 
faced by the landless farmers and peasants. They 
have lost their livelihoods and shelter. Because 
they do not own the lands or their houses, most 
do not qualify for government compensation. 
This money has gone to the landowners. In 
addition, the government’s cheap loans and other 
facilities have gone to the feudal lords and big 
farmers, with little offered to the poor peasants 
and small farmers. These groups have been 
forced to turn to the exorbitant rates offered by 
private money lenders and the feudal lords.
For its part, the government has offered 
inexpensive loans and other assistance to 
the feudal lords and big farmers, but little or 
nothing to the masses of peasants and small 
farmers. Instead, these groups have been left 
on their own. In short, the floods will further 
impoverish the hundreds of thousands of already 
extremely poor peasants and farmers. The sad 
situation is best summarized by Rebecca Anne 
Dixon and Ambassador Teresita Schaffer:
Some observers suggest that the disaster 
will change the feudal system under which 
much of Pakistan’s rural farming areas still 
operate. What is more likely is that it will 
exacerbate the competition for land and 
work among the “have-nots” of the large 
landholdings in Sindh and southern Punjab. 
Hard times generally reinforce existing 
dependency relationships in parts of Pakistan 
that have large landholdings. The Pakistan 
floods, although prompting a measure of 
demographic change, have not had the radical 
132. Burki, “State, Entrepreneurship and the Common Good,” Dawn, August 16, 2010.
133. Ishrat Husain, “Preparing for the Future,” The News, July 4, 2011.
134. “Pakistan: Floods Uncover Evidence of Feudalism’s Impact on Poor,” AlterNet, February 17, 2011.
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impact on the will of the federal government 
that would be required to counter this trend.135
Increased employment opportunities in the 
more urban areas for those escaping from 
feudalism would seem to be the best alternative 
to weakening the feudal system at this point. 
Microfinanced small industries could play a vital 
role in this regard.
As Safiya Aftab has noted, the post-floods 
situation did present a unique opportunity to 
undertake tough economic reforms “instead of 
looking towards the world to bail Pakistan out of  
a major crisis. The floods are a game-changer and 
we may never go back to being in a position where 
the next SBA bails us out. Let us by all means fulfill 
our international obligations, but let’s not think 
that we can just muddle on as before, periodically 
blackmailing the world with the threat of the 
consequences of collapse of a nuclear power 
dealing with growing militancy. The world  
simply does not have the resources to get us  
out of this mess.”136 
It is unclear whether the floods in and of 
themselves convinced the government to initiate 
the country’s New Growth Framework (approved 
as the country’s official development strategy in 
May 2011). If they did, and Olson’s encompassing 
coalitions begin to grow as a result of expanded 
entrepreneurship stimulated by the free market 
policies incorporated in the framework, then the 
floods may well be responsible for a gradual shift in 
power from stagnation and poverty to reform and 
broad-based growth. 
Conclusion
As originally conceived, Expeditionary Economics 
was seen as an effective tool in restoring economic 
growth and prosperity to post-conflict situations. 
Although devastated by recent conflict, these 
countries possessed an active entrepreneurial class 
capable of responding quickly to opportunities 
opened up by improved security and the support 
of the U.S. military. Presumably the conflict had 
removed or weakened previous institutional and 
interest group impediments to entrepreneurship, 
giving the country a clean slate and fresh start 
in creating a viable, dynamic economy.
The present study has focused on Pakistan, 
where instability and conflict are ongoing and 
well-established groups with strong vested interests 
abound. Even in such a situation, the results 
presented above suggest that an entrepreneurial-
based development strategy is on firm theoretical 
and empirical grounds. The results imply that in 
Pakistan’s case, the implementation of Expeditionary 
Economics in conflict and disaster situations has the 
potential to produce immediate gains in growth, 
employment, and stability. Over time, the 
institutional reforms induced by the entrepreneurial 
class would enable the country to overcome 
existing impediments to sustained growth and 
move to higher levels of development.
In summary, the study found that (see Fig. 18):
–  It is unlikely in Pakistan’s current institutional/
political setting that traditional aid programs, 
even with greatly expanded funding, could 
initiate a process of institutional development and 
reform sufficient to offset Pakistan’s current slow 
growth and cycle of violence.
–  However, an extensive quantitative assessment 
of successful country growth patterns found that 
entrepreneurial activity is a key element in driving 
the growth process through progressive stages of 
economic development.
–  Successful countries whose development relies on 
increased entrepreneurial activity appear to sustain 
growth through a series of ongoing reforms 
initiated by this growing stakeholder group. As a 
result, they are able to establish virtuous circles of 
increased economic liberalization, extended 
135. Rebecca Anne Dixon and Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, “Pakistan Floods: Internally Displaced People and the Human Impact,” Center for 
Strategic and International Studies South Asia Monitor no. 147 (2010): 2.
136. Aftab, “Revamping the Economy,” The Friday Times, September 10, 2010.
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entrepreneurship, expanded growth, and 
improved governance, which lead in turn to 
further growth and development.
–  Increased trade liberalization and improvements 
in the business climate are the most important 
factors for stimulating entrepreneurial expansion 
for countries at Pakistan’s stage of development. 
–  Consequently, entrepreneurial efforts could 
be expanded in the short term without major 
improvements in governance. 
–  Entrepreneurship-led development could 
potentially create a virtuous of circle of growth 
and reform in Pakistan capable of overcoming the 
constraints of violence, bureaucratic inertia, and 
the country’s many vested interests.
–  In principle, Pakistan’s New Growth Framework 
incorporates all of the elements noted above.
–  The principles of Expeditionary Economics should 
facilitate a policy shift toward the New Growth 
Framework, especially in areas where the central 
government has thus far been unable to be an 
effective agent for economic betterment.
–  There are numerous opportunities for the  
United States and European Union to contribute 
to Pakistan’s economic revival and sustained 
growth.
–  Finally, although Pakistan is not strictly a  
post-conflict setting, but one that shares many 
similar elements of instability, the empirical 
findings highlighting the importance of trade 
liberalization and increased business freedom 
provide a tentative answer to one of the research 
agenda questions originally posed by Rebecca 
Patterson and Dane Stangler: “How to develop 
and promote a private business sector in  
post-conflict countries.”137 
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Fig. 18. Overview of Findings
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